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Abstract
We present new practical local differentially private heavy hitters algorithms achieving optimal or near-optimal
worst-case error and running time – TreeHist and Bitstogram. In both algorithms, server running time is O˜(n) and
user running time is O˜(1), hence improving on the prior state-of-the-art result of Bassily and Smith [STOC 2015] re-
quiring O(n5/2) server time and O(n3/2) user time. With a typically large number of participants in local algorithms
(n in the millions), this reduction in time complexity, in particular at the user side, is crucial for making locally private
heavy hitters algorithms usable in practice. We implemented Algorithm TreeHist to verify our theoretical analysis
and compared its performance with the performance of Google’s RAPPOR code.
1 Introduction
We revisit the problem of computing heavy hitters with local differential privacy. Such computations have already
been implemented to provide organizations with valuable information about their user base while providing users with
the strong the strong guarantee that their privacy would be preserved even if the organization is subpoenaed for the
entire information seen during an execution. Two prominent examples are Google’s use of RAPPOR in the Chrome
browser [11] and Apple’s use of differential privacy in iOS-10 [19]. These tools are used for learning new words typed
by users and identifying frequently used emojis and frequently accessed websites.
Differential privacy in the local model. Differential privacy [10] provides a framework for rigorously analyzing
privacy risk and hence can help organization mitigate users’ privacy concerns as it ensures that what is learned about
any individual user would be (almost) the same whether the user’s information is used as input to an analysis or not.
Differentially private algorithms work in two main modalities: curator and local. The curator model assumes a
trusted centralized curator that collects all the personal information and then analyzes it. In contrast, the local model
does not involve a central repository. Instead, each piece of personal information is randomized by its provider to
protect privacy even if all information provided to the analysis is revealed. Holding a central repository of personal
information can become a liability to organizations in face of security breaches, employee misconduct, subpoenas, etc.
This makes locally private computations attractive for implementation. Indeed in the last few years Google and Apple
have announced successful deployments of locally private analyses [11, 19].
Challenges of the local model. A disadvantage of the local model is that it requires introducing noise at a significantly
higher level than what is required in the curator model. Furthermore, some tasks tasks which are possible in the curator
model are impossible in the local model [10, 16, 8]. To see the effect of noise, consider estimating the number of HIV
positives in a given population of n participants. In the curated model, it suffices to add Laplace noise of magnitude
O(1), i.e., independent of n [10]. In contrast, a lowerbound of Ω(
√
n) is known for the local model [8]. A higher
noise level implies that the number of participants n needs to be large (maybe in the millions for a reasonable choice
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of ). An important consequence is that, to be practical, locally private algorithms must exhibit low time, space, and
communication complexity, especially at the user side. This is the problem addressed in our work.
Heavy hitters and histograms in the local model. Assume each of n users holds an element xi taken from a
domain of size d. A histogram of this data lists (an estimate of) the duplicity of each domain element. When d is
large, a succinct representation of the histogram is desired either in form of a frequency oracle – a data structure
allowing to approximate the duplicity of any domain element – or heavy hitters – listing the duplicity of most frequent
domain elements, implicitly considering the duplicity of other domain elements as zero. The problem of computing
histograms with differential privacy has attracted significant attention both in the curator model [10, 5, 7] and the local
model [15, 11, 4]. Of relevance is the work in [17].
We briefly report on the state of the art heavy hitters algorithms of Bassily and Smith [4] and Thakurta et al. [19],
which are most relevant for the current work. Bassily and Smith provide matching lower and upper bounds of
Θ(
√
n log(d)/) on the worst-case error of local heavy hitters algorithms. Their local algorithm exhibits optimal
communication but a rather high time complexity: Server running time is O(n5/2) and, crucially, user running time
is O(n3/2) – complexity that severely hampers the practicality of this algorithm1. The construction by Thakurta et
al. is a heuristic with no bounds on server running time and accuracy.2 User computation time is O˜(1), a significant
improvement over [4].
Our contributions. The focus of this work is on the design of locally private heavy hitters algorithms with near
optimal error, keeping time, space, and communication complexity minimal. We provide two new constructions of
heavy hitters algorithms TreeHist and Bitstogram. These algorithms achieve similar performance but apply different
techniques. We implemented Algorithm TreeHist and provide measurements in comparison with RAPPOR [11] (the
only currently available implementation for local histograms). Our measurements are performed with a setting that
is favorable to RAPPOR (i.e., a small input domain), yet they indicate that Algorithm TreeHist performs better than
RAPPOR in terms of noise level.
Table 1 details various performance parameters of algorithms TreeHist and Bitstogram, and the reader can check
in the table that these are similar up to small factors which we ignore for the rest of this paragraph. Comparing
with [4], we improve time complexity both at the server (reduced from O(n5/2) to O˜(n)) and at the user (reduced
from O(n3/2) to O(max (log n, log d)2)). Comparing with [19], we get provable bounds on the server running time
and worst-case error. Note that Algorithm Bitstogram achieves optimal worst-case error whereas Algorithm TreeHist
is almost optimal, by a factor of
√
log(n).
Performance metric TreeHist Bitstogram
Server time (modular multiplications) O˜ (n) O˜ (n)
User time (modular multiplications) O
(
max (logn, log d)2
)
O
(
max (logn, log d)2
)
Server processing memory O˜ (
√
n) O˜ (
√
n)
User memory O (max(log d, logn)) O (max(log d, logn))
Communication/user O (1) O (1)
Worst-case Error O
(√
n log(n) log(d)
)
O
(√
n log(d)
)
Table 1: Performance of our protocols. Dependency on the privacy parameter  and failure probability β is omitted.
Elements of the constructions. Main details of our constructions are presented in sections 3.1 and 3.2. These are
complemented with the detailed descriptions and analyses in the appendix. Both our algorithms make use of frequency
oracles – data structures that allow estimating various counts.
Algorithm TreeHist identifies heavy-hitters and estimates their frequencies by scanning the levels of a binary prefix
tree whose leaves correspond to dictionary items. The recovery of the heavy hitters is in a bit-by-bit manner. As the
algorithm progresses down the tree it prunes all the nodes that cannot be prefixes of heavy hitters, hence leaving
O˜(
√
n) nodes in every depth. This is done by making queries to a frequency oracle. Once the algorithm reaches the
1If pubic randomness or efficient Private Information Retrieval is assumed, then the user running time in [4] can be improved to O(n).
2The underlying construction in [19] is of a frequency oracle.
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final level of the tree it identifies the list of heavy hitters. It then invokes the frequency oracle once more on those
particular items to obtain more accurate estimates for their frequencies.
Algorithm Bitstogram hashes the input domain into a domain of size roughly
√
n. The observation behind this
algorithm is that if a heavy hitter x does not collide with other heavy hitters then (h(x), xi) would have a significantly
higher count than (h(x),¬xi) where xi is the ith bit of x. This allows recovering all bits of x in parallel given an
appropriate frequency oracle.
2 Background and Preliminaries
2.1 Definitions and Notation
Dictionary and user items: Let V = [d]. We consider a set of n users, where each user i ∈ [n] holds an item vi ∈ V .
We will use vi to refer to the binary representation of vi when it is clear from the context.
Item frequency (duplicity): For each item v ∈ V, we define the frequency f(v) of v as the number of users holding
v, namely,
f(v) , |{i ∈ [n] : vi = v}| .
Frequency oracle: A frequency oracle is a data structure together with an algorithm that, for any given v ∈ V , allows
computing an estimate fˆ(v) of the frequency f(v).
Heavy hitters (succinct histogram): A succinct histogram is a data structure that provides a (short) list of items
(vˆ1, ..., vˆk), called the heavy hitters, together with estimates for their frequencies (fˆ(vˆj) : j ∈ [k]). The frequencies
of the items not in the list are implicitly estimated as fˆ(v) = 0. We measure the error in a succinct histogram by the
`∞ distance between the estimated and true frequencies, maxv∈[d]
∣∣∣fˆ(v)− f(v)∣∣∣. We will also consider the maximum
error restricted to the items in the list (vˆ1, ..., vˆk), that is, maxj∈[k]
∣∣∣fˆ(vˆj)− f(vˆj)∣∣∣. If a succinct histogram aims to
provide `∞ error η, the list does not need to contain more than O(1/η) items since items with estimated frequencies
below η may be omitted from the list.
2.2 Local Differential Privacy
In the local model, an algorithm A : V → Z accesses the database v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Vn only via an oracle that,
given index i ∈ [n], runs a randomized algorithm (local randomizer)R : V → Z˜ on input vi and returnsR(vi) to A.
Definition 2.1 (Local differential privacy [10, 12, 16]). An algorithm satisfies -local differential privacy (LDP) if
it accesses the database v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Vn only via invocations of a local randomizer R and if for all i ∈
[n], if R(1), . . . ,R(k) denote the algorithm’s invocations of R on the data sample vi, then the algorithm A(·) ,(R(1)(·),R(2)(·), . . . ,R(k)(·)) is -differentially private. That is, if for any pair of inputs v,v′ that differ on a single
input, and for all S ⊆ Range(A),
Pr[A(v) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[A(v′) ∈ S].
2.3 Count Sketch and Hadamard Transform
Count sketch [9] together with Hadamard transform form the basis of our differentially private construction outlined
in Section 3.1 and discussed in detail in Section 5.
Count sketch [9] is a sketching algorithm for finding frequent elements in a data stream. Let V = [d] be a domain
of data elements, and v = (v1, . . . , vn) be a stream of data elements. Count sketch ensures that for any given v ∈ V ,
using a data structure of size m = O
(
n log(1/β)
k
)
one can ensure that with probability at least 1 − β the estimated
frequency of v is within k of the true frequency, and the estimate is unbiased. The algorithm works as follows: First,
pick t pairs of hash functions (hi : V → [m], gi : V → {−1, 1}), and set a matrix M = {0}t×m. Second, with every
3
data sample vi, populate the matrix as follows: ∀j ∈ [t],M[j, hj(vi)] ← M[j, hj(vi)] + gj(vi). Finally, to estimate
the frequency of an element v ∈ V , compute median {M[1, h1(v)] · g1(v), · · · ,M[t, ht(v)] · gt(v)}.
Hadamard transform: We use Hadamard transform followed by sampling in order to compress our data transmission
from the client to the server and to reduce the space requirements of our protocol. Hadamard transform of a vectorw ∈
Rm is obtained via multiplying with the Hadamard transform matrix Hm ∈ {− 1√m , 1√m}m×m defined recursively as
Hm =
1√
2
[
Hm/2 Hm/2
Hm/2 −Hm/2
]
, and H1 = [1]. Two main properties of Hadamard transform we use are: i) it is a dense
basis transformation, i.e. the columns of the Hadamard matrix form a basis, and each entry of
√
m ·Hm is in {−1, 1},
and ii) any entry (i, j) in
√
m ·Hm can be computed in O(logm) time.
2.4 Error correction codes
We will use error correction codes in order to reduce the error of (some of) our constructions outlined in Section 3.2
and discussed in detail in Section 6.
Definition 2.2. A binary (n, k)-code is a pair of mappings (Enc,Dec) where Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n, and Dec :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}k. The code is ζ-decodable if for every x ∈ {0, 1}k and every y ∈ {0, 1}n whose Hamming distance
to Enc(x) is at most ζn we have that Dec(y) = x.
For any constant 0 < ζ < 1/4, there is a construction of a ζ-decodable (n, k)-code, where n = O(k), and
furthermore, Enc and Dec run in time O(n). See, e.g., [14].
2.5 Tools from Probability
2.5.1 k-wise Independence
We will use the following tail bound on sums of k-wise independent random variables.
Lemma 2.3 ([6]). Let λ ≥ 6 be an even integer. Suppose X1, · · · , Xn are k-wise independent random variables
taking values in [0, 1]. Let X = X1 + · · ·+Xn and µ = E[X], and let α > 0. Then,
Pr[|X − µ| ≥ α] ≤
(
nk
α2
)k/2
.
2.5.2 The Poisson Approximation
We will use the following useful facts about the Poisson approximation. When throwing n balls into R bins, the
distribution of the number of balls in a given bin is Bin(n, 1/R). As the Poisson distribution is the limit distribution
of the binomial distribution, the distribution of the number of balls in a given bin is approximately Pois(n/R). In fact,
in some cases we could approximate the joint distribution of the number of balls in all the bins by assuming the load
at each bin is an independent Poisson random variable with mean n/R.
Theorem 2.4 (e.g., [18]). Suppose that n balls are thrown intoR bins independently and uniformly at random, and let
Xi be the number of balls in the ith bin, where 1 ≤ i ≤ R. Let Y1, · · · , YR be independent Poisson random variables
with mean n/R. Let f(x1, · · · , xR) be a nonnegative function. Then,
E [f(X1, · · · , XR)] ≤ e
√
nE [f(Y1, · · · , YR)] .
In particular, the theorem states that any event that takes place with probability p in the Poisson case, takes place
with probability at most pe
√
n in the exact case (this follows by letting f be the indicator function of that event).
We will also use the following bounds for the tail probabilities of a Poisson random variable:
Theorem 2.5 ([3]). Let X have Poisson distribution with mean µ. For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
Pr[X ≤ µ(1− α)] ≤ e−α2µ/2
Pr[X ≥ µ(1 + α)] ≤ e−α2µ/2.
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3 Our Algorithms
In this section we give an informal description of our algorithms, and highlight some of the ideas behind our construc-
tions.
3.1 The TreeHist Protocol
We briefly give an overview of our construction that is based on a compressed, noisy version of the count sketch. To
maintain clarity of the main ideas, we give here a high-level description of our construction. We refer to Section 5 for
a detailed description of this construction.
We first introduce some objects and public parameters that will be used in the construction:
Prefixes: For a binary string v, we will use v[1 : `] to denote the `-bit prefix of v. Let V = {v ∈ {0, 1}` for some ` ∈
[log d]
}
. Note that elements of V arranged in a binary prefix tree of depth log d, where the nodes at level ` of the tree
represent all binary strings of length `. The items of the dictionary V represent the bottommost level of that tree. Note
that |V| = 2d. We will use ⊥ to denote an empty string. For a v ∈ {0, 1}` and b ∈ {0, 1}, let v‖b denote the `+ 1-bit
string resulting from appending the bit b to v. For a binary string v, we define Child(v) ,
{
v‖0, v‖1}, that is, the set
containing the two children of v in the prefix tree. Similarly, for a set of strings U , we define ChildSet(U) , {v : v ∈
Child(u) for some u ∈ U}.
Hashes: Let t,m be positive integers to be specified later. We will consider a set of t pairs of hash functions
{(h1, g1), . . . , (ht, gt)}, where for each i ∈ [t], hi : V → [m] and gi : V → {−1,+1} are independently and uni-
formly chosen pairwise independent hash functions.
Basis matrix: Let W ∈ { − 1,+1}m×m be √m ·Hm where Hm is the Hadamard transform matrix of size m. As
will be shown later, we will be making operations over the entries of this matrix. It is important to note that we do not
need to store this matrix. The value of any entry in this matrix can be computed in O(logm) bit operations given the
(row, column) index of that entry. In particular, suppose we want to compute the value of the entry Wi,j located at the
i-th row and j-th column. Let (i0, i1, . . . , ilogm−1) and (j0, j1, . . . , jlogm−1) denote the bit representation of i and j,
respectively. Then, Wi,j = (−1)
∑logm−1
k=0 ikjk .
Global parameters: The total number of users n, the size of the Hadamard matrix m, the number of hash pairs t, the
privacy parameter , the confidence parameter β, and the hash functions
{
(h1, g1), . . . , (ht, gt)
}
are assumed to be
public information. We set t = O(log(n/β)) and m = O
(√
n
log(n/β)
)
.
Public randomness: In addition to the t hash pairs {(h1, g1), . . . , (ht, gt)}, we assume that the server creates a
random partition Π : [n] → [log d] × [t] that assigns to each user i ∈ [n] a random pair (`i, ji) ← [log(d)] × [t], and
another random function Q : [n]← [m] that assigns3 to each user i a uniformly random index ri ← [m]. We assume
that such random indices `i, ji, ri are shared between the server and each user.
First, we describe the two main modules of our protocol.
3.1.1 A local randomizer: LocalRnd
For each i ∈ [n], user i runs her own independent copy of a local randomizer, denoted as LocalRnd, to generate her
private report. LocalRnd of user i starts by acquiring the index triple (`i, ji, ri) ← [log d] × [t] × [m] from public
randomness. For each user, LocalRnd is invoked twice in the full protocol: once during the first phase of the protocol
(called the pruning phase) where the high-frequency items (heavy hitters) are identified, and a second time during the
final phase (the estimation phase) to enable the protocol to get better estimates for the frequencies of the heavy hitters.
In the first invocation, LocalRnd of user i performs its computation on the `i-th prefix of the item vi of user i, whereas
in the second invocation, it performs the computation on the entire user’s string vi.
Apart from this, in both invocations, LocalRnd follows similar steps. It first selects the hash pair (hji , gji), com-
putes ci = hji(vi[1 : ˜`]) (where ˜` = `i in the first invocation and ˜` = log d in the second invocation, and vi[1 : ˜`] is
3We could have grouped Π andQ into one random function mapping [n] to [log d]× [t]× [m], however, we prefer to split them for clarity of
exposition as each source of randomness will be used for a different role.
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the ˜`-th prefix of vi), then it computes a bit xi = gji
(
vi[1 : ˜`]
)
·Wri,ci (where Wr,c denotes the (r, c) entry of the
basis matrix W). Finally, to guarantee -local differential privacy, it generates a randomized response yi based on xi
(i.e., yi = xi with probability e/2/(1 + e/2) and yi = −xi with probability 1/(1 + e/2), which is sent to the server.
Our local randomizer can thought of as a transformed, compressed (via sampling), and randomized version of the
count sketch [9]. In particular, we can think of LocalRnd as follows. It starts off with similar steps to the standard count
sketch algorithm, but then deviates from it as it applies Hadamard transform to the user’s signal, then samples one bit
from the result. By doing so, we can achieve significant savings in space and communication without sacrificing
accuracy.
3.1.2 A frequency oracle: FreqOracle
Suppose we want to allow the server estimate the frequencies of some given subset V̂ ⊆ {0, 1}` for some given
` ∈ [log d] based on the noisy users’ reports. We give a protocol, denoted as FreqOracle, for accomplishing this task.
For each queried item vˆ ∈ V̂ and for each hash index j ∈ [t], FreqOracle computes c = hj(vˆ), then collects the
noisy reports of a collection of users I`,j that contains every user i whose pair of prefix and hash indices (`i, ji) match
(`, j). Next, it estimates the inverse Hadamard transform of the compressed and noisy signal of each user in I`,j . In
particular, for each i ∈ I`,j , it computes yi Wri,c which can be described as a multiplication between yieri (where
eri is the indicator vector with 1 at the ri-th position) and the scaled Hadamard matrix W, followed by selecting the
c-th entry of the resulting vector. This brings us back to the standard count sketch representation. It then sums all the
results and multiplies the outcome by gj(vˆ) to obtain an estimate fˆj(vˆ) for the frequency of vˆ. As in the count sketch
algorithm, this is done for every j ∈ [t], then FreqOracle obtains a high-confidence estimate by computing the median
of all the t frequency estimates.
3.1.3 The protocol: TreeHist
The protocol is easier to describe via operations over nodes of the prefix tree V of depth log d (described earlier). The
protocol runs through two main phases: the pruning (or, scanning) phase, and the final estimation phase.
In the pruning phase, the protocol scans the levels of the prefix tree starting from the top level (that contains just
0 and 1) to the bottom level (that contains all items of the dictionary). For a given node at level ` ∈ [log d], using
FreqOracle as a subroutine, the protocol gets an estimate for the frequency of the corresponding `-bit prefix. For any
` ∈ [log(d) − 1], before the protocol moves to level ` + 1 of the tree, it prunes all the nodes in level ` that cannot be
prefixes of actual heavy hitters (high-frequency items in the dictionary).Then, as it moves to level ` + 1, the protocol
considers only the children of the surviving nodes in level `. The construction guarantees that, with high probability,
the number of survining nodes in each level cannot exceed O
(√
n
log(d) log(n)
)
. Hence, the total number of nodes
queried by the protocol (i.e., submitted to FreqOracle) is at most O
(√
n log(d)
log(n)
)
.
In the second and final phase, after reaching the final level of the tree, the protocol would have already identified
a list of the candidate heavy hitters, however, their estimated frequencies may not be as accurate as we desire due to
the large variance caused by the random partitioning of users across all the levels of the tree. Hence, it invokes the
frequency oracle once more on those particular items, and this time, the sampling variance is reduced as the set of
users is partitioned only across the t hash pairs (rather than across log(d)× t bins as in the pruning phase). By doing
this, the server obtains more accurate estimates for the frequencies of the identified heavy hitters. The privacy and
accuracy guarantees are stated below. The full details are given in Section 5.
3.1.4 Privacy and Utility Guartantees
Theorem 3.1. Protocol TreeHist is -local differentially private.
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Theorem 3.2. There is a number η = O
(√
n log(n/β) log(d))/
)
such that with probability at least 1 − β, the
output list of the TreeHist protocol satisfies the following properties:
1. it contains all items v ∈ V whose true frequencies above 3η.
2. it does not contain any item v ∈ V whose true frequency below η.
3. Every frequency estimate in the output list is accurate up to an error ≤ O
(√
n log(n/β)/
)
3.2 The Bitstogram Protocol
We now present a simplified description of our second protocol, that captures most of the ideas. Any informalities
made hereafter are removed in the full description of the protocol (Section 6).
First Step: Frequency Oracle. Recall that a frequency oracle is a protocol that, after communicating with the users,
outputs a data structure capable of approximating the frequency of every domain element v ∈ V . So, if we were to
allow the server to have linear runtime in the domain size |V| = d, then a frequency oracle would suffice for computing
histograms. As we are interested in protocols with a significantly lower runtime, we will only use a frequency oracle
as a subroutine, and query it only for (roughly)
√
n elements.
Let Z ∈ {±1}d×n be a matrix chosen uniformly at random, and assume that Z is publicly known.4 That is, for
every domain element v ∈ V and every user j ∈ [n], we have a random bit Z[v, j] ∈ {±1}. As Z is publicly known,
every user j can identify its corresponding bit Z[vj , j], where vj ∈ V is the input of user j. Now consider a protocol
in which users send randomized responses of their corresponding bits. That is, user j sends yj = Z[vj , j] w.p. 12 +

2
and sends yj = −Z[vj , j] w.p. 12 − 2 . We can now estimate the frequency of every domain element v ∈ V as
a(v) =
1

·
∑
j∈[n]
yj · Z[v, j].
To see that a(v) is accurate, observe that a(v) is the sum of n independent random variables (one for every user). For
the users j holding the input v (that is, vj = v) we will have that 1E[yj · Z[v, j]] = 1. For the other users we will
have that yj and Z[v, j] are independent, and hence E[yj · Z[v, j]] = E[yj ] · E[Z[v, j]] = 0. That is, a(v) can be
expressed as the sum of n independent random variables: f(v) variables with expectation 1, and (n− f(v)) variables
with expectation 0. The fact that a(v) is an accurate estimation for f(v) now follows from the Hoeffding bound.
Lemma 3.3 (Algorithm Hashtogram). Let  ≤ 1. Algorithm Hashtogram satisfies -LDP. Furthermore, with
probability at least 1− β, algorithm Hashtogram answers every query v ∈ V with a(v) satisfying: |a(v)− f(v)| ≤
O
(
1
 ·
√
n log
(
nd
β
))
.
Second Step: Identifying Heavy-Hitters. Let us assume that we have a frequency oracle protocol with worst-case
error τ . We now want to use our frequency oracle in order to construct a protocol that operates on two steps: First, it
identifies a small set of potential “heavy-hitters”, i.e., domain elements that appear in the database at least 2τ times.
Afterwards, it uses the frequency oracle to estimate the frequencies of those potential heavy elements.5
Let h : V → [T ] be a (publicly known) random hash function, mapping domain elements into [T ], where T will be
set later.6 We will now use h in order to identify the heavy-hitters. To that end, let v∗ ∈ V denote such a heavy-hitter,
appearing at least 2τ times in the database S, and denote t∗ = h(v∗). Assuming that T is big enough, w.h.p. we will
have that v∗ is the only input element (from S) that is mapped (by h) into the hash value t∗. Assuming that this is
indeed the case, we will now identify v∗ bit by bit.
For ` ∈ [log d], denote S` = (h(vj), vj,`)j∈[n], where vj,` is bit ` of vj . That is, S` is a database over the domain
([T ]×{0, 1}), where the row corresponding to user j is (h(vj), vj,`). Observe that every user can compute her own
4As we later explain, Z has a short description, as it need not be uniform.
5Event though we describe the protocol as having two steps, the necessary communication for these steps can be done in parallel, and hence, our
protocol will have only 1 round of communication.
6As with the matrix Z, the hash function h can have a short description length.
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row locally. As v∗ is a heavy-hitter, for every ` ∈ [log d] we have that (t∗, v∗` ) appears in S` at least 2τ times, where
v∗` is bit ` of v
∗. On the other hand, as we assumed that v∗ is the only input element that is mapped into t∗ we get that
(t∗, 1− v∗` ) does not appear in S` at all. Recall that our frequency oracle has error at most τ , and hence, we can use it
to accurately determine the bits of v∗.
To make things more concrete, consider the protocol that for every hash value t ∈ [T ], for every coordinate
` ∈ [log d], and for every bit b ∈ {0, 1}, obtains an estimation (using the frequency oracle) for the duplicity of (t, b) in
S` (so there are log d invocations of the frequency oracle, and a total of 2T log d estimations). Now, for every t ∈ [T ]
let us define vˆt where bit ` of vˆt is the bit b s.t. (t, b) is more frequent than (t, 1 − b) in S`. By the above discussion,
we will have that vˆt∗ = v∗. That is, the protocol identifies a set of T log d domain elements, containing all of the
heavy-hitters. The frequency of the identified heavy-hitters can then be estimated using the frequency oracle.
Remark 3.1. As should be clear from the above discussion, it suffices to take T & n2, as this will ensure that there
are no collisions among different input elements. As we only care about collisions between “heavy-hitters” (appearing
in S at least
√
n times), it would suffice to take T & n to ensure that w.h.p. there are no collisions between heavy-
hitters. In fact, we could even take T & √n, which would ensure that a heavy-hitter v∗ has no collisions with constant
probability, and then to amplify our confidence using repetitions.
Lemma 3.4 (Algorithm Bitstogram). Let  ≤ 1. Algorithm Bitstogram satisfies -LDP. Furthermore, the
algorithm returns a list L of length O˜(
√
n) satisfying:
1. With probability 1− β, for every (v, a) ∈ L we have that |a− f(v)| ≤ O
(
1

√
n log(n/β)
)
.
2. W.p. 1− β, for every v ∈ V s.t. f(v) ≥ O
(
1

√
n log(d/β) log( 1β )
)
, we have that v is in L.
4 Detailed Experimental Results
In this section we discuss implementation details of our algorithms mentioned in Section 57. The main objective of
this section is to emphasize the empirical efficacy of our algorithms along with the theoretical optimality in terms
of error, space, time and communication. [19] recently claimed space space optimality for a similar problem, but a
formal analysis (or empirical evidence) was not provided. Our experiments corroborate both the analytical bounds in
our current work, and in [19]. Our experiments are performed on a macOS-Sierra 10.12 system (in Python 2.7) with
3.3Ghz (Intel Core i5) and 16GB of DDR-3 RAM.
4.1 Private Frequency Oracle
In this experiment, the objective is to test the efficacy of our algorithm in estimating the frequencies of a known set of
dictionary of user items, under local differential privacy. We estimate the error in estimation while varying the size of
the data set n, changing the privacy parameter . (See Section 2.1 for a refresher on the notation.)
Figure 1 shows results on a synthetic data set with the domain size of hundred (i.e., d = 100) drawn from a power
law distribution with power of 15. The default parameters used in Figure 1 are: number of data samples (n) : 10
million, range of the hash function (m):
√
n, number of hash functions (t): 285, and the privacy parameter  = 2.0.
For the hash functions, we used the prefix bits of SHA-256. The estimated frequency is scaled by the number of
samples to normalize the result, and each experiment is averaged over ten runs. The bars for True refers to the the
true frequencies, and the bars for Priv corresponds to the differentially private frequencies. The pctle corresponds
to the frequency of a domain element at the corresponding percentile in the frequency distribution of the data set.
Observations: i) The plots corroborate the fact that the frequency oracle is indeed unbiased. The average frequency
estimate (over ten runs) for each percentile is within one standard deviation of the corresponding true estimate. ii)
The error in the estimates go down significantly as the number of samples are increased or the privacy parameter  is
increased.
In Figure 2 we show the result of changing the range of the hash function (m). The observation is that the results
are seemingly insensitive to the range of the hash function.
7The experiments are performed without the Hadamard compression during data transmission.
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Figure 1: Frequency vs number of samples (n) and privacy parameter () on the synthetic data set.
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Figure 2: Frequency vs sketch width (m) on the synthetic data set.
We also ran the same experiment (Figure 3) on a real data set drawn uniformly at random the NLTK Brown corpus
[1]. The data set we created has n = 10 million samples drawn i.i.d. from the corpus with replacement, and the system
parameters are the same default parameters described earlier. In this plot, the rank corresponds to the rank of a domain
element in the distribution of frequencies in the data set. The observation is here is also consistent with that of Figure
1.
Comparison to RAPPOR [11]: Here we compare ourselves to the only other system (RAPPOR project from GOOGLE)
for the private frequency estimation problem whose code is publicly available. We took the snapshot of their code base
(https://github.com/google/rappor) on May 9th, 2017. In order to perform a fair comparison, we tested
our algorithm against one of their demo experiments available (Demo3 using the demo.sh script). We used the privacy
parameter  = ln(3), the number of data samples n = 1 million, and the data set to be the same data set generated by
the demo.sh script. In Figure 4 we observe that for higher frequencies both RAPPOR and our algorithm perform sim-
ilarly. However, in lower frequency regimes, the RAPPOR estimates are zero most of the times, while our estimates
are closer to the true estimates. N.B. We do not claim that our algorithm would outperform the RAPPOR system on
all problem instances. However, our current experiment does highlight the need to perform an at-scale comparison
between the two algorithms.
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Figure 3: Frequency vs privacy () on the NLTK-Brown corpus.
4.2 Private Heavy-hitters
In this section, we take on the harder task of identifying the heavy hitters, rather than estimating the frequencies
of domain elements. We run our experiments on the same two data sets described earlier with the same setting of
parameters, except now we assume that we do not know the domain. As a part of our algorithm design, we assume
that every element in the domain is from the english alphabet set [a-z] and are of length exactly equal to six. If they
are of larger length, we truncate then before entering them in the data set, and if they are of smaller length we tag a
⊥ at the end. We generate the domain elements for the synthetic data set by first generating the frequency histogram
based on the power law distribution described earlier, and then assign random strings of length eight to each bin of
the histogram. That becomes our data set. For the NLTK Brown corpus [1], we sample n = 10 million samples with
replacement from the corpus to form our data set. We set a threhold of 15 · √n as the threshold for being a heavy
hitter. We measure the efficacy of our system by measuring the precision and recall. Figures 5 and 6 show the true
data distribution for the synthetic and the NLTK data set.
In Table 4.2 we state our corresponding precision and recall parameters. Our recall numbers are much better than
the precision numbers, primarily because of the large number of negative examples (3 × 108 examples). In practice,
if there are false-positives, they can be easily pruned using domain expertise. For example, if we are trying to identify
new words which users are typing in English [2], then using the domain expertise of English, a set of false positives
can be easily ruled out by inspecting the list of heavy hitters output by the algorithm. Further, notice that since we
are working with domain elements with size six characters, a brute force algorithm would require 266 queries to the
frequency oracle, which would be computationally (near) infeasible. While there are other algorithms for finding
heavy-hitters [4, 15], either they do not provide any theoretical guarantee for the utility [11, 13, 19], or there does not
exist a scalable and efficient implementation for them. Our work scores well on both these aspects.
Data set # of unique words Precision Recall
Synthetic 93 0.36 (σ = 0.05) 0.95 (σ = 0.03)
NLTK Brown corpus 25991 0.24 (σ = 0.04) 0.86 (σ = 0.05)
Table 2: Private Heavy-hitters with threshold=15
√
n. Here σ corresponds to the standard deviation.
5 Locally Private Heavy-hitters via Count-Sketch: The TreeHist Protocol
We start with a detailed description of our construction described at a high level in Section 3.1.
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Figure 4: Frequency vs privacy () on the Demo 3 experiment from RAPPOR
We refer to Section 3.1 for definitions and public parameters that will be used in the construction, namely, prefixes,
hashes, the basis matrix, global parameters, and public randomness. We restate below our public parameters and,
when applicable, their specific settings.
Global parameters: We will assume that total number of users n, the size of the Hadamard matrix m, the num-
ber of hash pairs t, the privacy parameter , and the confidence parameter β are public parameters, and hence they
will not be explicitly provided as inputs to the algorithms. For integer parameters, we will implicitly assume that
results are rounded to the nearest integer. We set t = 110 log(n/β) and m = 48
√
n
log(n/β) . The hash functions{
(h1, g1), . . . , (ht, gt)
}
will also be assumed to be public information (this is O(log(d) log(n/β)) bits of shared ran-
domness).
Public randomness: In addition to the t hash pairs {(h1, g1), . . . , (ht, gt)}, we assume that the server creates a random
partition Π : [n]→ [log d]×[t] over the set of users, that is, a each user i gets a random pair (`i, ji)← [log(d)]×[t] that
represents the index of one of log(d)× t “buckets.” Moreover, the server uses another random functionQ : [n]← [m]
that assigns to each user i a uniformly random index ri ← [m]. We assume that such random indices `i, ji, ri are
shared between the server and each user. For each ` ∈ [log d] and each j ∈ [t], we define I`,j ,
{
i : `i = `, ji = j
}
and Ij ,
{
i : ji = j
}
= ∪`∈[log d]I`,j .
5.1 A Local Randomizer: LocalRnd
For each i ∈ [n], user i runs her own independent copy of Algorithm 1 below, refered to as LocalRnd, to generate her
private report. We note that LocalRnd takes a flag Final ∈ {0, 1} as an input. The role of this input will become clear
when we discuss the full protocol. In a nutshell, the flag is used to distinguish between two invocations of LocalRnd.
In particular, the local randomizer of each user is invoked twice in the full protocol: once during the first phase of the
protocol (called the pruning phase) where the high-frequency items (heavy hitters) are identified, and a second time
during the final phase (the final estimation phase) to enable the protocol to get better estimates for the frequencies of
the heavy hitters.
Connection to count sketch and Hadamard transform: Our local randomizer can thought of as a transformed,
compressed (via sampling), and randomized version of the count sketch. Up to Step 5 in LocalRnd (Algorithm 1), our
algorithm follows the standard count sketch algorithm [9]. Starting from Step 6, we start to deviate from the standard
count sketch as we apply Hadamard transform to the user’s signal, then sample one bit from the result. Indeed Step 6
can be thought of as a composition of two operations: first, we multiply the indicator vector eci ∈ {0, 1}m by the
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Figure 6: Distr. for Brown (top 100 words)
scaled Hadamard matrix W (this is equivalent to selecting wci : the ci-th column of W), then we randomly sample
one entry from wci . By doing so, we can achieve significant savings in space and communication without sacrificing
accuracy.
Algorithm 1 LocalRnd
Input: User i input: vi ∈ V , Flag: Final ∈ {0, 1}.
1: Using shared randomness, get random indices (`i, ji)← [log d]× [t] and ri ← [m].
2: if Final = 0 then
3: Set si := gji (vi[1 : `i]) and ci := hji (vi[1 : `i]) . {v[1 : `] denotes the `-bit prefix of v.}
4: else
5: Set si := gji (vi) and ci := hji (vi)
6: Compute xi := si ·Wri, ci
{Wr, c denotes the sign of the (r, c) entry of Hm (Hadamard matrix of size m).}
7: Generate a randomized version yi of the bit xi:
yi=
{
xi w.p. e
/2
e/2+1
−xi w.p. 1e/2+1
8: return yi.
The output of LocalRnd is 1 bit per invocation. Hence, during the entire span of the protocol, each user sends 2
bits to the server. Here, we will assume the user’s identity (i.e., the index i ∈ [n]) associated with each report is known
to the server, (e.g., from a higher layer in the communication protocol stack).
5.2 A Frequency Oracle: FreqOracle
Before describing our protocol for identifying the heavy hitters and estimating their frequencies, we first discuss a
protocol for a simpler task. Suppose we want to allow the server estimate the frequencies of some given subset
V̂ ⊆ {0, 1}` for some given ` ∈ [log d] based on the users’ reports. Algorithm 2 describes a protocol, denoted as
FreqOracle, for accomplishing this task. Note that in this protocol, we assume that all items whose frequencies are in
question are given as inputs.
For each queried item vˆ ∈ V̂ and for each hash index j ∈ [t], FreqOracle starts by collecting the noisy reports of
the collection I`,j of users where each user i ∈ I`,j is assigned a pair of prefix and hash indices (`i, ji) that matches
12
(`, j). Next, it estimates the inverse Hadamard transform of the compressed and noisy signal of each user in I`,j . It
then sums all the results and multiplies the outcome by gj(vˆ) to obtain an estimate fˆj(vˆ) for the frequency of vˆ. As in
the count sketch algorithm, this is done for every j ∈ [t], then FreqOracle obtains a high-confidence estimate for the
frequency of vˆ by computing the median of all the t frequency estimates.
Inverse transform and back to count sketch: We note here that Steps 7 in FreqOracle (Algorithm 2) can be
described as an inverse Hadamard transform of the users’ compressed and noisy signals. In particular, each term
yi Wri,c inside the sum can be described as a multiplication between yieri (where eri is the indicator vector with 1 at
the ri-th position) and the scaled Hadamard matrix W, followed by picking the c-th entry of the resulting vector. This
brings us back to the standard count sketch representation [9]. The FreqOracle protocol then proceeds to process the
frequency estimates in the same way a count sketch does. Indeed, Step 8 is a standard step in count sketch algorithm
where a high-confidence frequency estimate is obtained via the median technique. Hence, we attain the functionality of
the count sketch algorithm with much less space and communication by transforming the users’ signals to the Fourier
domain, compressing signals via sampling, and then transforming them back at the server.
Algorithm 2 FreqOracle
Input: Prefix length: ` ∈ [log d], a subset of `-bit prefixes V̂ ⊆ {0, 1}`, collection of t disjoint subsets of users:{I˜j : j ∈ [t]}, oracle access to items of relevant users: (vi : i ∈ ∪j∈[t]I˜j), scaling factor: γ, Flag: Final ∈
{0, 1}. {a , e/2+1e/2−1 is assumed to be a global constant seen by FreqOracle.}
1: for vˆ ∈ V̂ do
2: for Hash index j = 1 to t do
3: Set s := gj(vˆ) and c := hj(vˆ).
4: for Users i ∈ I˜j do
5: Get user-i’s 1-bit report: yi = LocalRnd(vi,Final)
6: Get user-i’s random index ri = Q(i) using public randomness.
7: Compute the j-th estimate of the frequency of vˆ: fˆj(vˆ) := γ · a
∑
i∈I˜j yi · s ·Wri,c.
8: Compute final estimate for the frequency of vˆ: fˆ(vˆ) := Median
({
fˆj(vˆ) : j ∈ [t]
})
.
9: FreqList :=
{(
vˆ, fˆ(vˆ)
)
: vˆ ∈ V̂
}
.
10: return FreqList.
5.3 Succinct Histogram via a Tree Aggregation Protocol: TreeHist
We now describe our protocol (Algorithm 3), denoted as TreeHist, that outputs a succinct histogram, that is, it outputs
a list of heavy hitters together with estimates for their frequencies. W.l.o.g., we will assume that n > log(n/β) log(d)
since otherwise, we cannot guarantee less than trivial error (i.e., an error of order n).
The TreeHist protocol:
The protocol is easier to describe via operations over nodes of the prefix tree V of depth log d. The protocol runs
through two main phases: the pruning (or, scanning) phase, and the final estimation phase.
In the pruning phase, the protocol scans the levels of the prefix tree starting from the top level (that contains just
0 and 1) to the bottom level (that contains all items of the dictionary). For a given node at level ` ∈ [log d], using
FreqOracle as a subroutine, the protocol gets an estimate for the frequency of the corresponding `-bit prefix. As
explained above, this estimate is obtained by FreqOracle by computing an estimate of the inverse Hadamard transform
for the signal from each user that gets assigned to this level of the tree, and aggregating the resulting signals in
exactly the same manner as it would be done in a standard count sketch (See Steps 7 and 8 in Algorithm 2). For any
` ∈ [log(d) − 1], before the protocol moves to level ` + 1 of the tree, it prunes all the nodes in level ` that cannot be
prefixes of actual heavy hitters (high-frequency items in the dictionary). Then, as it moves to level `+ 1, the protocol
considers only the children of the surviving nodes in level `. The construction guarantees that, with high probability,
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Algorithm 3 TreeHist The Full Protocol
Input: Oracle access to users’ items (vi ∈ V : i ∈ [n]).
1: Set η := 147
√
n log(n/β) log(d)/ and a := e
/2+1
e/2−1 .
2: Set γ := t log d {This setting will change at the final stage of the protocol.}
3: Initialize Prefixes = {⊥}.
4: for Prefix length ` = 1 to log d do
5: Get the collection
{I`,j : j ∈ [t]} using the random partition Π. {See “Public randomness” above.}
6:
{(
vˆ, fˆ(vˆ)
)
: vˆ ∈ ChildSet (Prefixes)
}
=
FreqOracle
(
`, ChildSet (Prefixes) ,
{I`,j : j ∈ [t]}, (vi : i ∈ ∪j∈[t]I`,j) , γ, Final = 0
)
.
7: Initialize NewPrefixes = ∅.
8: for v ∈ ChildSet (Prefixes) do
9: if fˆ(vˆ) ≥ 2η then
10: Add vˆ to NewPrefixes.
11: Update Prefixes← NewPrefixes.
12: Set γ := t
13: SuccHist := FreqOracle
(
log d, Prefixes,
{Ij : j ∈ [t]}, (vi : i ∈ [n]), γ, Final = 1).
{Here Ij = ∪`∈[log d]I`,j as defined earlier in the “Public randomness” paragraph.}
14: return SuccHist.
the number of survining nodes in each level cannot exceed O
(√
n
log(d) log(n/β)
)
. Hence, the total number of nodes
queried by the protocol (i.e., submitted to FreqOracle) is at most O
(√
n log(d)
log(n/β)
)
.
In the second and final phase, after reaching the final level of the tree, the protocol would have already identified
a list of potential heavy hitters, however, their estimated frequencies may not be as accurate as we desire due to the
large variance caused by the random partitioning of users across all the levels of the tree. Hence, the protocol invokes
the frequency oracle once more on those particular items, and this time, the sampling variance is reduced as the set of
users is partitioned only across the t hash pairs (rather than across log(d)× t bins as in the pruning phase). By doing
this, the server obtains more accurate estimates for the frequencies of the identified heavy hitters. The privacy and
accuracy guarantees are formally stated in the following section.
5.4 Running Time and Processing Memory
Running Time: We note that Algorithm FreqOracle (Algorithm 2) is invoked log(d)+1 = O(log d) times by TreeHist
(Algorithm 3): once per each level of the tree and another at the final estimation phase at the bottom level of the tree.
The main time-consuming step in FreqOracle is the summation in Step 7. This step is executed O
(√
n logn
log d
)
times in
every invocation of FreqOracle since there are O
(√
n
logn log d
)
nodes queried in every level of the tree and for each
node FreqOracle computes t ≈ log n frequency estimates. That is, in total, this step is executed O (√n log n log d)
times in the TreeHist protocol. A direct implementation would involve summing ≈ n bits each time this step is
executed, and hence would amount for running time of ≈ n1.5. However, we now show that this can be reduced to
≈ n.
Consider Step 7 of Algorithm FreqOracle when FreqOracle is invoked by TreeHist at any given prefix level ` ∈ [log d]
during the pruning phase. We will not consider the final estimation phase here since its running time is dominated
by that of the pruning ohase. Note that since the size of the basis matrix W is m = O
(√
n
logn
)
, there are only
14
O
(√
n
logn
)
values that the row index ri can take. Hence, fˆj(vˆ) (computed in Step 7) can be expressed as follows:
fˆj(vˆ) = γ · a
∑
κ∈[m]
 ∑
i∈I`,j : ri=κ
yi
 · s ·Wκ,c.
Thus, to implement Step 7 of FreqOracle for all items (`, j, vˆ), we first compute
(∑
i∈I`,j : ri=κ yi
)
for every κ ∈
[m], ` ∈ [log d], and j ∈ [t] (this amounts to a running time of O(n) in total). Then, for every value of (`, j, vˆ),
computing fˆj(vˆ) would require summing m = O
(√
n
logn
)
numbers. Hence, in total, the running time of TreeHist is
O
(√
n
logn log d ·m · t log d
)
= O
(
n
√
log d
)
.
Processing memory: For the implementation described above, Algorithm FreqOracle maintainsm ·t · log d sums of at
most n bits each. This would require a processing memory of O
(√
n log1.5(n) log(d)
)
bits. The memory required for
all the remianing steps of the TreeHist protocol does not exceed this amount, and hence, the total processing memory
required by TreeHist is O
(√
n log1.5(n) log(d)
)
bits.
5.5 Privacy and Utility Guartantees
In this section we provide the privacy and utility gurantees for the TreeHist protocol.
Theorem 5.1. [-Local Differential Privacy of the TreeHist Protocol] The TreeHist protocol (Algorithm 3) is -local
differentially private.
Theorem 5.2. [Utility of the TreeHist Protocol] Let η = 147
√
n log(n/β) log(d)/. With probability at least 1− β,
the output SuccHist of the TreeHist protocol (Algorithm 3) satisfies the following properties:
1. SuccHist contains all items v ∈ V whose true frequencies above 3η.
2. SuccHist does not contain any item v ∈ V whose true frequency below η.
3. Every frequency estimate in SuccHist is accurate up to an error ≤ 147
√
n log(n/β)

We defer the proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 to Appendix A.
The following lemma state the error guarantees of the Algorithm FreqOracle used by the TreeHist protocol. Note
that FreqOracle is invoked by the TreeHist protocol during both pruning and final estimation phases of the protocol.
This lemma is central to our proof of Theorem 5.2.
Lemma 5.3. Let β ∈ (0, 1). Let the number of hash pairs t ≥ 110 log(n/β), and the size of Hadamard basis matrix
m ≥ 48
√
n
log(n/β) . Consider algorithm FreqOracle (Algorithm 2) as invoked by the TreeHist protocol (Algorithm 3).
For any ` ∈ [log d], suppose that FreqOracle is invoked on inputs: `, subset V̂ ⊆ {0, 1}` of size |V̂| ≤ √n, collection
of users’ subsets
{I˜j : j ∈ [t]}, and scaling factor8 γ. Assuming that n ≥ 48t log(d), then, with probability 1− βlog d ,
we have:
∀ v ∈ V̂ : |f(v)− f(v)|14√nγ/.
where fˆ(v) is the estimate of FreqOracle for the true frequency f(v) of the item v ∈ V̂ .
Proof. Fix β ∈ (0, 1), ` ∈ [log d], t ≥ 110 log(n/β), m ≥ 48
√
n
log(n/β) , and a subset V̂ ⊆ {0, 1}` of size |V̂| ≤
√
n.
8Note that there are two possible settings for each of the collection {I˜j} and the scaling factor γ: one for each invocation of FreqOracle by
TreeHist, i.e., one for each value of the input flag Final. The generic notation {I˜j} and γ is used here to denote either of these two cases.
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We note that when FreqOracle is invoked by TreeHist in the pruning phase (i.e., Final = 0), the collection
{I˜j :
j ∈ [t]} = {I`,j : j ∈ [t]} and γ = t log d, whereas when FreqOracle is invoked by TreeHist in the final phase (i.e.,
Final = 1), the collection
{I˜j : j ∈ [t]} = {Ij : j ∈ [t]} and γ = t. We will use the generic notation {I˜j : j ∈ [t]}
and γ since the same proof works for both cases.
There are three main sources of randomness. The first is due to randomness in the collection
{I˜j : j ∈ [t]}
induced by the random partitioning of users via Π. The second source of randomness is due to the randomness in
the choice of the t hash pairs (h1, g1), . . . , (ht, gt). The third source of randomness is due to the random row indices
ri, i ∈ [n], generated by Q, and the randomization for privacy (step 7 in Algorithm 1).
Before we discuss the guarantees we can attain under these sources of randomness, we first introduce some nota-
tion. For j ∈ [t], v ∈ V̂,we define fI˜j (v) ,
∑
i∈I˜j 1 (vi[1 : `] = v); that is, fI˜j (v) is the number of users in I˜j whose
the `-prefix of their items is v, and define nI˜j ,
∣∣I˜j∣∣, i.e., nI˜j is the number of users in I˜j . Let fˆI˜1(v), . . . , fˆI˜t(v) be
independent Poisson random variables with mean f(v)γ , and let nˆI˜1 , . . . , nˆI˜t be independent Poisson random variables
with mean nγ .
For each v ∈ V̂ , let G1(v) =
{
j ∈ [t] : |γfI˜j (v)− f(v)| ≤ 4
√
nγ, n2 ≤ γnI˜j ≤ 2n
}
.
Claim 5.4. With probability 1− β3 log d over the randomness in
{I˜j : j ∈ [t]}, for every v ∈ V̂, we have |G1(v)| ≥ 910 t.
Fix v ∈ V̂ and j ∈ [t]. Consider the Poisson random variables hfI˜j (v) and nˆI˜j with mean
f(v)
γ and
n
γ , respec-
tively. By Theorem 2.5 (a tail bound for the Poisson distribution), the union bound, and assuming that n ≥ 48γ (the
assumption stated in the lemma), then with probability at least 0.996, we have
|γfˆI˜j (v)− f(v)| ≤ 4
√
nγ ,
n
2
≤ γnˆI˜j ≤ 2n.
Now, consider the sequences of independent Poisson random variables fˆI˜1(v), . . . , fˆI˜t(v) and nˆI˜1 , . . . , nˆI˜t as defined
above. Using the fact that t ≥ 110 log(n/β) ≥ 55 log
(
3en log d
β
)
, then by Chernoff’s bound, with probability at least
1− β3en log d , we have ∣∣∣{j ∈ [t] : |γfˆI˜j (v)− f(v)| ≤ 4√nγ , n2 ≤ γnˆI˜j ≤ 2n}∣∣∣ ≥ 910 t.
Using Theorem 2.4 (the Poisson approximation), with probability at least 1 − β
3
√
n log(d)
, we have |G1(v)| ≥ 910 t.
Hence, by the fact that |V̂| ≤ √n and the union bound, with probability at least 1 − β3 log d , for all v ∈ V̂ , we have
|G1(v)| ≥ 910 t.
For the remainder of the proof, we will condition on the event in Claim 5.4.
Let wc denote the c-th column of the basis matrix W. Since the prefix length ` is fixed, we will denote vi[1 : `]
(the `-prefix of the item of user i) as vi for brevity.
For each v ∈ V̂ , let G2(v) =
{
j ∈ [t] :
∣∣∣∣ γ∑i∈I˜j gj(vi)·gj(v)m · 〈whj(vi),whj(v)〉 − f(v)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 8√γn}
Claim 5.5. Conditioned on the event in Claim 5.4, with probability at least 1 − β3 log d over the choice of the t hash
pairs
{
(hj , gj) : j ∈ [t]
}
, for all v ∈ V̂ , we have |G2(v)| ≥ 45 t.
Fix v ∈ V̂ and j ∈ G1(v). First consider
∣∣∣∣∑i∈I˜j gj(vi)·gj(v)m · 〈whj(vi),whj(v)〉 − fI˜j (v)∣∣∣∣. Note that the columns
of W are orthogonal, and each of them has norm
√
m. Hence, the error quantity above comes from those i ∈ I˜j with
vi 6= v and yet hj(vi) = hj(v). In particular, we can write this error as∣∣ ∑
i∈I˜j
zi gj(vi) gj(v)
∣∣
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where zi = 1 (vi 6= v, hj(vi) = hj(v)). Define VBad =
{
vˆ ∈ V̂ : fI˜j (vˆ) ≥ 2
√
nI˜j
}
. Note that
∣∣VBad∣∣ ≤ √nI˜j/2.
Now, observe that
P
hj ,gj
 ∣∣∑
i∈I˜j
zi gj(vi) gj(v)
∣∣ > 2√nI˜j
 ≤ P
hj ,gj
[∃ vˆ ∈ VBad : hj(vˆ) = hj(v)]
+ P
hj ,gj
 ∣∣∑
i∈I˜j
zi gj(vi) gj(v)
∣∣ > 2√nI˜j ∣∣ ∀ vˆ ∈ VBad, hj(vˆ) 6= hj(v)

By the pairwise independence property of hj and the union bound, the first probability term on the right hand side
is bounded from above by |VBad|m =
√
nI˜j
2m . We now consider the second probability term. Note that the event we
conditioned on in the second probability term implies that for every i ∈ I˜j where vi 6= v, we must have fI˜j (vi) <
2
√
nI˜j . Hence, conditioned on this event, by the pairwise independence of each of hj and gj , we have
Var
∑
i∈I˜j
zi gj(vi) gj(v)
 = ∑
i∈I˜j
Var [zi gj(vi)] +
∑
i,k∈I˜j :
vi=vk 6=v
E [zizk]E [gj(vi)gj(vk)]
≤ nI˜j/m+ 2n
3/2
I˜j /m ≤ 3n
3/2
I˜j /m.
Hence, by using Chebyshev’s inequality, the second probability term is bounded by
3
√
nI˜j
4m . Hence, we have
P
hj ,gj
 ∣∣∑
i∈I˜j
zi gj(vi) gj(v)
∣∣ > 2√nI˜j
 ≤ 5√nI˜j
4m
≤
√
log(n/β)
25
√
γ
≤ 1
250
,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that j ∈ G1(v) and the fact that m ≥ 48
√
n
log(n/β) . Thus, with
probability at least 0.996, for every v ∈ V̂ and every j ∈ G1(v), we have∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈I˜j
gj(vi) · gj(v)
m
· 〈whj(vi),whj(v)〉 − fI˜j (v)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2√nI˜j .
Now, as we conditioned on the event in Claim 5.4, this implies that with probability at least 0.996, for every v ∈ V̂
and every j ∈ G1(v), we have∣∣∣∣ γ∑
i∈I˜j
gj(vi) · gj(v)
m
· 〈whj(vi),whj(v)〉 − f(v)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ γ∑
i∈I˜j
gj(vi) · gj(v)
m
· 〈whj(vi),whj(v)〉 − γfI˜j (v)
∣∣∣∣+ |γfI˜j (v)− f(v)|
≤ 8√γn.
Conditioned on the event of Claim 5.4, |G1(v)| ≥ 910 t ≥ 99 log(n/β) ≥ 49 log
(
3
√
n log d
β
)
. We note also that, for
all j ∈ [t], the above sums are independent. Thus, conditioned on the event of Claim 5.4, by Chernoff’s bound, with
probability at least 1 − β
3
√
n log d
, we have |G2(v)| ≥ 2225 |G1(v)| ≥ 45 t. Hence, by the fact that |V̂| ≤
√
n and the
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union bound, with probability at least 1 − β3 log d , for all v ∈ V̂ , we have |G2(v)| ≥ 45 t. We continue the proof while
conditioning on this event as well.
For every i ∈ [n] let ri ← [m] be the row index chosen uniformly at random for user i using the random function
Q, and let yi denote the randomized bit generated by user i in step 7 of Algorithm 1. As was denoted in algo-
rithm FreqOracle, for each v ∈ V̂, let fˆj(v) = γa
∑
i∈I˜j yi gj(v) Wri,hj(v) denote the j-th frequency estimate of
FreqOracle for v ∈ V̂ .
For each v ∈ V̂ , let
G3(v) =
{
j ∈ [t] : ∣∣fˆj(v)− f(v)∣∣ ≤ 14√nγ/}.
Claim 5.6. Conditioned on the events in Claims 5.4 and 5.5, with probability at least 1− β3 log d over the randomness
in
{
(ri, yi) : i ∈ I˜j , j ∈ [t]
}
, for all v ∈ V̂ , we have |G3(v)| ≥ 710 t
Fix v ∈ V̂ and j ∈ G2(v). Note that, conditioned on any realization for I˜j , each term in the sum∑
i∈I˜j
(
a yi gj(v) Wri,hj(v) −
gj(vi) gj(v)
m
〈whj(vi),whj(v)〉
)
is independent, zero mean random variable whose support length is bounded by a+1 = O
(
1

)
. Hence, by Chernoff’s
bound, with probability at least 0.99, we have
∣∣ ∑
i∈I˜j
(
a yi gj(v) Wri,hj(v) −
gj(vi) gj(v)
m
〈whj(vi),whj(v)〉
)∣∣ ≤ 4√nI˜j/.
Thus, conditioned on the events in Claims 5.4 and 5.5, with probability at least 0.99, we have∣∣γ∑
i∈I˜j
a yi gj(v) Wri,hj(v) − f(v)
∣∣ ≤ 14√γn/,
i.e., |fˆj(v)− f(v)
∣∣ ≤ 14√nγ/.
Conditioned on the event of Claim 5.5, |G2(v)| ≥ 45 t ≥ 88 log(n/β) ≥ 44 log
(
3
√
n log d
β
)
. We note also that the
above sums for j = 1, . . . , t are independent. Thus, conditioned on the event of Claim 5.5, by Chernoff’s bound, with
probability at least 1− β
3
√
n log d
, we have |G3(v)| ≥ 2225 |G2(v)| ≥ 88125 t ≥ 710 t. Hence, by the fact that |V̂| ≤
√
n and
the union bound, with probability at least 1− β3 log d , for all v ∈ V̂ , we have |G3(v)| ≥ 710 t.
By combining Claims 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, we conclude that with probability at least 1− βlog d , for all v ∈ V̂ , we have∣∣∣∣{j ∈ [t] : |fˆj(v)− f(v)| ≤ 14√nγ/}∣∣∣∣ > 12 t.
Since for any item v, the final frequency estimate fˆ(v) generated by FreqOracle is the median of fˆ1(v), . . . , fˆt(v),
then the above implies that with probability at least 1− βlog d , for all v ∈ V̂ , we have |fˆ(v)− f(v)| ≤ 14
√
nγ/. This
completes the proof of the lemma.
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6 Locally Private Heavy-hitters bit-by-bit: The Bitstogram Protocol
We will use the following notation. Let S ∈ Vn be a database, which may be distributed across n users (each holding
one row). For v ∈ V , we will be interested in estimating the the duplicity of v in S, i.e., fS(v) = |{vi ∈ S : vi = v}|.
6.1 Warmup: A Simple Protocol for Heavy-Hitters
For readability, we first present a simplification of our protocol that captures most of the ideas. We will later modify
the construction in order to reduce the worst-case error, space complexity, and time complexity of the protocol.
6.1.1 Frequency Oracle
Our protocols use the simple local randomizer R (Algorithm 4), where every user holds one bit, and flips it with
probability 1/(e + 1).
Algorithm 4R: Basic Randomizer
Inputs: x ∈ {±1}, and privacy parameter .
1. Generate and return a random bit z =
{
x w.p. e/(e + 1)
−x w.p. 1/(e + 1)
Algorithm 5 ExplicitHist
Public randomness: Uniformly random matrix Z ∈ {±1}d×n.
Setting: Each player j ∈ [n] holds a value vj ∈ V . Define S = (v1, · · · , vn).
Define S˜ = (v˜1, · · · , v˜n) where v˜j = Z [vj , j].
Oracle: LR Oracle access to S˜.
1. For j ∈ [n] let yj ← LRS˜(j,R).
2. On input v ∈ V , return a(v) = e+1e−1 ·
∑
j∈[n] yj · Z[v, j], and wait for the next input.
Lemma 6.1. Let  ≤ 1, and fix a subset V ⊆ V of size d′ ≤ d. With probability at least 1 − β, algorithm
ExplicitHist answers every v ∈ V with a(v) satisfying:
|a(v)− fS(v)| ≤ 3

√
n · ln(4d′/β).
Proof. Fix v ∈ V , and denote c(v) = ∑j∈[n] yj · Z[v, j], and recall that algorithm ExplicitHist answers the
query v with a(v) = e
+1
e−1 · c(v). We start by analyzing the expectation of c(v):
E[c(v)] =
∑
j∈[n]
E [yj · Z[v, j]] =
∑
j∈[n]:vj=v
E [yj · Z[v, j]] +
∑
j∈[n]:vj 6=v
E [yj · Z[v, j]]
=
∑
j∈[n]:vj=v
E [yj · Z[v, j]] +
∑
j∈[n]:vj 6=v
E [yj ] · E [Z[v, j]] = fS(v) · e
 − 1
e + 1
.
That is, c(v) can be expressed as two sums of ±1 independent random variables: fS(v) variables with expectation
e−1
e+1 , and (n − fS(v)) variables with expectation 0. Using the Hoeffding bound, with probability at least 1 − βd′ we
have that |c(v)− e−1e+1 · fS(v)| ≤
√
n · ln(4d′/β). That is, |a(v)− fS(v)| ≤ e+1e−1 ·
√
n · ln(4d′/β). Using the union
bound, this holds simultaneously for every v ∈ V with probability at least 1− β.
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Observation 6.1. For the analysis above it suffices that, for every j ∈ [n], the entries of column j of Z are only
pairwise independent. Furthermore, appealing to Lemma 2.3 (concentration of k-wise independent random variables)
instead of the Hoeffding bound, is suffices that, for every v ∈ V , the entries of row v of Z are only k-wise independent,
for k = 3 ln(d/β).
6.1.2 A Simple Heavy Hitters Protocol
Algorithm 6 SuccinctHist
Public randomness: Random hash function h : V → [T ].
Random partition of [n] into log d subsets I1, · · · , Ilog d.
Setting: Each player j ∈ [n] holds a value vj ∈ V . Define S = (v1, · · · , vn).
For ` ∈ [log d], let S` = (h(vj), vj,`)j∈I` , where vj,` is bit ` of vj .
That is, S` is a database over the domain [T ]×{0, 1}.
1. For ` ∈ [log d], use ExplicitHist(S`) with 2 to get a`(t, b) for all (t, b) ∈ [T ]×{0, 1}.
2. For t ∈ [T ], define vˆt ∈ V , where bit ` of vˆt is vˆt,` = argmax{a`(t, 0), a`(t, 1)}.
3. Use ExplicitHist(S) with privacy parameter 2 to obtain a(vˆt) for all t ∈ [T ].
4. Return list L = {(vˆt, a(vˆt)) : t ∈ [T ]}.
Lemma 6.2. Let  ≤ 1, denotew , 32 log(d) log(16 log d)+ 48
√
2n log d · ln(64 log d), and set T = 32nw . Algorithm
SuccinctHist returns a list L of length T satisfying:
1. With probability 1− β, for every (v, a) ∈ L we have that |a− fS(v)| ≤ 6
√
n · ln(4T/β).
2. For every v ∈ V s.t. fS(v) ≥ w, with probability 1/2 we have that v is in L.
Remark 6.2. The log log d factors in the above lemma can be removed by using an error correction code s.t. in order
to recover a “heavy-hitter” v∗ it suffices to recover correctly only part of its (encoded) bits.
Proof. Item 1 of the lemma follows directly from Lemma 6.1. We now prove item 2. Assuming that n ≥ 12 log(d) log(12 log d),
by the Chernoff bound, with probability at least 7/8 (over partitioning [n] into subsets I1, · · · , Ilog d), for every
` ∈ [log d] we have that n2 log d ≤ |I`| ≤ 2nlog d . We continue the analysis assuming that this is the case.
Fix v∗ ∈ V s.t. fS(v∗) ≥ w, and consider the following good event (over sampling h):
Event E1 : |{v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and h(v) = h(v∗)}| ≤ w/4.
Event E1 states that v∗ is mapped (by the hash function h) into a cell without too many collisions with different
input elements. Denote t∗ = h(v∗). While the duplicity of v∗ in S is at least w, event E1 states that other than v∗
there are at most w/4 elements which are mapped into t∗. That is, v∗ dominates the cell t∗. We first show that if E1
occurs, then w.h.p. v∗ is in the list L.
Asserting that w ≥ 32 log(d) log(16 log d), by the Chernoff bound we get that with probability 7/8 (over parti-
tioning [n] into subsets I1, · · · , Ilog d), for every ` ∈ [log d] we have that
fS`(h(v
∗), v∗` ) ≥ fS`(h(v∗), 1− v∗` ) +
w
4 log d
.
If that is the case, then by the properties of algorithm ExplicitHist, for w ≥ 48
√
2n log d · ln(64 log d), with
probability at least 1 − 18 log d we have that vˆt∗,` = v∗` , where t∗ = h(v∗). Using the union bound, this holds
simultaneously for all ` ∈ [log d] with probability at least 7/8, in which case v∗ = vˆt∗ is in the list L.
It remains to show that Event E1 occurs with high probability. To that end, observe that
Eh [| {v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and h(v) = h(v∗)} |] =
∑
v∈S:v 6=v∗
Eh
[
1h(v)=h(v∗)
] ≤ n
T
.
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Thus, by Markov’s inequality, we have that
Pr
[
| {v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and h(v) = h(v∗)} | ≥ 8n
T
]
≤ 1
8
.
Setting T = 32nw completes the proof.
6.2 Reducing Space and Time Complexities
6.2.1 Space and Time Efficient Frequency Oracle
Algorithm 7 Hashtogram
Public randomness: Random partition of [n] into R subsets I1, · · · , IR.
Random hash functions h1, · · · , hR mapping V to [T ].
Uniformly random matrix Z ∈ {±1}T×n.
Setting: Each player j ∈ [n] holds a value vj ∈ V . Define S = (v1, · · · , vn).
Define S˜ = (v˜1, · · · , v˜n), where v˜j = Z [hr(vj), j] and hr is s.t. j ∈ Ir.
Oracle: LR Oracle access to S˜.
1. For j ∈ [n] let yj ← LRS˜(j,R).
2. For every (r, t) ∈ [R]×[T ] compute ar(t) = e+1e−1 ·
∑
j∈Ir yj · Z[t, j].
3. On input v ∈ V , return a(v) = R ·Median{a1(h1(v)), · · · , aR(hR(v))}, and wait for the next input.
Lemma 6.3. Algorithm Hashtogram satisfies -LDP.
Lemma 6.4. Let  ≤ 1, and fix a subset V ⊆ V of size d′ ≤ d to be queried to algorithm Hashtogram. Let
algorithm Hashtogram be executed with R ≥ 132 log(4d′/β), and T ≥ 2 · log(d′/β) +  ·√n/ log(d′/β), and
n ≥ 8R log(8d′/β). With probability at least 1 − β, algorithm Hashtogram answers every v ∈ V with a(v)
satisfying:
|a(v)− fS(v)| ≤ 27

·
√
nR log(
2Rd′
β
).
Observe that the error in the lemma is sub-optimal, as the optimal error behaves like 1
√
n log d. However, we will
only use Lemma 6.4 with constant d′ and constant β, and hence, will not be effected by this issue. A similar analysis
(for the same algorithm) gives better bounds for other settings of parameters. Specifically,
Lemma 6.5. Let  ≤ 1. Fix a subset V ⊆ V of size d′ ≤ d to be queried to algorithm Hashtogram. Let algorithm
Hashtogram be executed with R ≥ 300 log(12nd′/β) and n ≥ 43R and T ≥  ·√n/ log(nd′/β). With probability
at least 1− β, algorithm Hashtogram answers every v ∈ V with a(v) satisfying:
|a(v)− fS(v)| ≤ 400

·
√
n log
(
12nd′
β
)
.
As the analysis of the two lemmas are very similar, we only present the proof of Lemma 6.5. The proof of
Lemma 6.4 appears in Section B for completness.
Proof of Lemma 6.5. Consider the following good event:
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Event E1 (over sampling h1, · · ·, hR):
For every query v∗ ∈ V there exists a subset Rv∗1 ⊆ [R] of size |Rv
∗
1 | ≥ 78R s.t. for every r∗ ∈ Rv
∗
1 it holds that
|{v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(v) = hr∗(v∗)}| ≤ 16nT .
Event E1 states that for at least 7R/8 of the hash functions, we have that v∗ is mapped into a cell without too
many collisions with different input elements. Informally, for every single hash function hr, algorithm Hashtogram
estimates the number of occurrences of hr(v∗) in S. Hence, if event E1 occurs, then most of the estimations result in
accurate answers. We start by showing that event E1 happens with high probability. To that end, fix v∗ ∈ V and fix
r∗ ∈ [R]. We have that
Ehr∗ [| {v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(v) = hr∗(v∗)} |] =
∑
v∈S:v 6=v∗
Ehr∗
[
1hr∗ (v)=hr∗ (v∗)
] ≤ n
T
.
Thus, by Markov’s inequality, we have that
Pr
hr∗
[
| {v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(v) = hr∗(v∗)} | ≥ 16n
T
]
≤ 1
16
.
As the hash functions are independent from each other, for R ≥ 48 ln(d′β ), by the Chernoff bound we get that with
probability at least 1 − β/d′ (over sampling h1, · · · , hR) there exists a subset Rv∗1 ⊆ [R] of size |Rv
∗
1 | ≥ 78R s.t. for
every r∗ ∈ Rv∗1 it holds that
|{v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(v) = hr∗(v∗)}| ≤ 16n
T
.
Using the union bound over every v∗ ∈ V , we have that event E1 happens with probability at least 1−β. We continue
the analysis assuming that event E1 occurs.
Event E2 (over partitioning [n] into I1, · · ·, IR):
There exists a subset R2 ⊆ [R] of size |R2| ≥ 78R s.t. for every r ∈ R2 it holds that n2R ≤ |Ir| ≤ 2nR .
Following Theorem 2.4 (the Poisson approximation), we analyze event E2 in the Poisson case. To that end, let
Iˆ1, · · · , IˆR be independent Poisson random variables with mean n/R. Now fix r ∈ R. Using a tail bound for the
Poisson distribution (see Theorem 2.5), assuming that n ≥ 43R we have that Pr[ n2R ≤ Iˆr ≤ 2nr ] ≥ 99100 . As
Iˆ1, · · · , IˆR are independent, assuming that R ≥ 300 ln(3nβ ), by the Chernoff bound we get that event E2 happens with
probability at least 1 − β3n in the Poisson case. Hence, by Theorem 2.4, event E2 happens with probability at least
1− β. We continue the analysis assuming that this is the case.
For every r ∈ [R], let Sr = (vj)j∈Ir denote a database containing the data of all users j s.t. j ∈ Ir. Also for
v∗ ∈ V and r ∈ [R] denote Sr,v∗ , {v ∈ S : hr(v) = hr(v∗)}. That is, |Sr,v∗ | is the number of users j s.t.
hr(vj) = hr(v
∗). Furthermore, for v∗ ∈ V and r ∈ [R] denote Iv∗r , {v ∈ Sr : hr(v) = hr(v∗)}. That is, |Iv
∗
r | is
the number of users j s.t. j ∈ Ir and hr(vj) = hr(v∗). Observe that |Sr,v∗ | ≥ fS(v∗) and that |Iv∗r | ≥ fSr (v∗).
Event E3 (over partitioning [n] into I1, · · ·, IR):
For every query v∗ ∈ V there exists a subset Rv∗3 ⊆ [R] of size |Rv
∗
3 | ≥ 910R s.t. for every r∗ ∈ Rv
∗
3 it holds that∣∣ R · |Iv∗r | − |Sr,v∗ | ∣∣ ≤ √8Rn
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We analyze eventE3 in the Poisson case. To that end, fix v∗ ∈ V , and let Iˆv∗1 , · · · , Iˆv
∗
R be independent Poisson ran-
dom variables with mean |S
r,v∗ |
R . Now fix r ∈ [R]. Using a tail bound for the Poisson distribution (see Theorem 2.5),
with probability at least 19/20 we have that∣∣∣ R · Iˆv∗r − |Sr,v∗ | ∣∣∣ ≤ √8Rn. (1)
As Iˆv
∗
1 , · · · , Iˆv
∗
R are independent, assuming thatR ≥ 300 ln( 3nd
′
β ), by the Chernoff bound we get that with probability
at least 1− β3nd′ , Inequality (1) holds for at least 18/20 choices of r ∈ [R]. By Theorem 2.4 (the Poisson approxima-
tion), with probability at least 1 − βd′ , this is also the case for the random variables |Iv
∗
r |. That is, with probability at
least 1− βd′ , there exists a subset Rv
∗
3 ⊆ [R] of size |Rv
∗
3 | ≥ 910R s.t. for every r∗ ∈ Rv
∗
3 it holds that∣∣∣ R · |Iv∗r | − |Sr,v∗ | ∣∣∣ ≤ √8Rn.
Using the union bound over every choice of v∗ ∈ V , we get that event E3 happens with probability at least 1− β. We
continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case.
Event E4 (over sampling Z and the coins of the local randomizers):
For every query v∗ ∈ V there exists a subset Rv∗4 ⊆ [R] of size |Rv
∗
4 | ≥ 78 · 910R s.t. for every r∗ ∈ Rv
∗
4 it holds that∣∣ R · ar∗(hr∗(v∗))−R · |Iv∗r∗ | ∣∣ ≤ e+1e−1 · √11nR.
For v∗ ∈ V and r ∈ [R] denote cr(v∗) =
∑
j∈Ir yj · Z[hr(v∗), j], and recall that algorithm Hashtogram
answers the query v∗ ∈ V with a(v∗) = R · e+1e−1 ·Median{cr(v∗)}r∈[R]. Fix v∗ ∈ V and r ∈ R2 (where R2 ⊆ [R]
is the subset from event E2). We now analyze the expectation of cr(v∗):
E[cr(v∗)] =
∑
j∈Ir
E [yj · Z[hr(v∗), j]]
=
∑
j∈Ir: hr(vj)=hr(v∗)
E [yj · Z[hr(v∗), j]] +
∑
j∈Ir: hr(vj) 6=hr(v∗)
E [yj · Z[hr(v∗), j]]
=
∑
j∈Ir: hr(vj)=hr(v∗)
E [yj · Z[hr(v∗), j]] +
∑
j∈Ir: hr(vj) 6=hr(v∗)
E [yj ] · E [Z[hr(v∗), j]]
= |{v ∈ Sr : hr(v) = hr(v∗)}| · e
 − 1
e + 1
, |Iv∗r | ·
e − 1
e + 1
That is, cr(v∗) can be expressed as two sums of±1 independent random variables: |Iv∗r | variables with expectation
e−1
e+1 , and (|Ir| − |Iv
∗
r |) variables with expectation 0 (recall that by event E2 we have n2R ≤ |Ir| ≤ 2nR ). Using the
Hoeffding bound, with probability at least 43/44 we have that
∣∣∣ cr(v∗)− e−1e+1 · |Iv∗r | ∣∣∣ ≤√11n/R. That is,∣∣∣ R · ar(hr(v∗))−R · |Iv∗r | ∣∣∣ ≤ e + 1e − 1 · √11nR. (2)
Fix v∗ ∈ V , and observe that the above sums are independent for different values of r. Hence, using the Chernoff
bound and asserting that R ≥ 150 ln(d′/β), for that fixed v∗ ∈ M , with probability at least 1 − β/d′ we have that
Inequality (2) holds for at least 7R/8 choices of r ∈ R1. Using the union bound, with probability at least 1 − β, this
is true for every v∗ ∈ V simultaneously. That is, event E4 happens with probability at least 1 − β. We continue the
analysis assuming that event E4 occurs.
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We are now ready to complete the proof. Fix v∗ ∈ V . Combining events E3 and E4, we get that for every
r ∈ Rv∗3 ∩Rv
∗
4 ∣∣∣ R · ar(hr(v∗))− |Sr,v∗ | ∣∣∣ ≤ e + 1
e − 1 ·
√
11nR+
√
8Rn. (3)
Recall that for every r ∈ [R] we have that |Sr,v∗ | ≥ fS(v∗). Furthermore, by event E1, for every r ∈ Rv∗1 we
have that |Sr,v∗ | ≤ fS(v∗) + 16nT . Hence, for every r ∈ Rv
∗
1 ∩Rv
∗
3 ∩Rv
∗
4 we have that
| R · ar(hr(v∗))− fS(v∗) | ≤ e
 + 1
e − 1 ·
√
11nR+
√
8Rn+
16n
T
, error(v∗).
That is, for every r ∈ Rv∗1 ∩Rv
∗
3 ∩Rv
∗
4 we have thatR·ar(hr(v∗)) is accurate up to error(v∗). As |Rv
∗
1 ∩Rv
∗
3 ∩Rv
∗
4 | ≥
9
16R, and as algorithm Hashtogram answers v
∗ with a(v∗) chosen as the median of {R · ar(hr(v∗))}, we get that
|a(v∗)− fS(v∗)| ≤ error(v∗). This holds for every v∗ ∈M .
Processing Memory. Algorithm Hashtogram maintains (on step 2) R · T sums of at most n bits. This requires
O(R · T · log n) bits for processing memory.
Runtime. Observe that a direct implementation of (step 2 of) algorithm Hashtogram consists of summing a total
of T ≈ √n bits per user, and hence results in a runtime of ≈ n1.5. As we next explain, this can be reduced to ≈ n.
First observe that for the analysis of Lemma 6.5 (specifically, for the analysis of Event E4), it suffices that, for every
j ∈ [n], the entries of column j of Z are only pairwise independent. That is, each column of Z consists of T ≈ √n
pairwise independent bits. We can represent such a column using log T ≈ log√n bits, in which case there are at most
T ≈ √n choices for the columns of Z (see, e.g., Construction 3.18 in [20]). So, even though the matrix Z contains
n columns, it has at most T ≈ √n distinct columns. Let us denote those distinct columns as z1, . . . , zT , where zγ [t]
denotes the bit in position t in this column. We will write Z[·, j] = zγ to indicate that the jth column of Z is zγ . With
this notation, we can restate ar(t) (computed on step 2 of algorithm Hashtogram) as follows.
ar(t) =
e + 1
e − 1 ·
∑
j∈Ir
yj · Z[t, j] = e
 + 1
e − 1 ·
∑
1≤γ≤T
 ∑
j∈Ir s.t. Z[·,j]=zγ
yj
 · zγ [t].
Thus, we can implement step 2 of algorithm Hashtogram by first computing
(∑
j∈Ir s.t. Z[·,j]=zγ yj
)
for every
1 ≤ γ ≤ T and 1 ≤ r ≤ R (this amounts to summing a total of n bits, and can be done it time ≈ n). Afterwards, for
every choice of (r, t), computing ar(t) consists of summing T ≈
√
n elements. Overall, step 2 of the algorithm can
be executed in time ≈ R · T · T ≈ n log n.
6.2.2 The Full Protocol
Remark 6.3. The execution of Hashtogram on step 4 is made using the parameters stated in Lemma 6.5, in order
to obtain accurate answers for every fixture of n queries with probability 1− β. The executions of Hashtogram on
step 1 are made using the parameters stated in Lemma 6.4, in order to obtain accurate answers for every fixture of two
queries with probability 255/256. Observe that every such instantiation of Hashtogram is queried 2T times, and
hence, some of these queries might result in inaccurate answers. Nevertheless, as will be made clear later, due to our
use of error correction code, these inaccurate answers will not effect the final outcome of the algorithm.
Lemma 6.6. Algorithm Bitstogram satisfies -LDP.
Lemma 6.7. Let  ≤ 1, and assume that log d ≥ O(log(n/β)). Set R = O (log(1/β)) and T = O
(
·n√
R log d
)
.
Algorithm Bitstogram returns a list L of length R · T satisfying:
1. With probability 1− β, for every (v, a) ∈ L we have that |a− fS(v)| ≤ O
(
1

√
n log(n/β)
)
.
2. With probability 1− β, for every v ∈ V s.t. fS(v) ≥ O
(
1

√
n log(d) log( 1β )
)
, we have that v is in L.
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Algorithm 8 Bitstogram
Tool used: Binary code (Enc,Dec), where Enc : V → V ′, correcting 18 -fraction of errors.
We use a code with constant rate, that is log d′ = O(log d), where d = |V| and d′ = |V ′|.
Public randomness: Random partition of [n] into R log d′ subsets Ir,` for (r, `) ∈ [R]×[log d′].
Random hash functions h1, · · · , hR mapping V ′ to [T ].
Setting: Each player j ∈ [n] holds a value vj ∈ V . Define S = (v1, · · · , vn).
For every j ∈ [n] denote cj = Enc(vj) ∈ V ′.
For (r, `) ∈ [R]×[log d′], let Sr,` = (hr(cj), cj,`)j∈Ir,` , where cj,` is bit ` of cj .
That is, Sr,` is a database over the domain [T ]×{0, 1}.
1. For (r, `) ∈ [R]×[log d′], use Hashtogram(Sr,`) with 2 to get
{
ar,`(t, b) : (t, b) ∈ [T ]×{0, 1}
}
.
2. For (r, t) ∈ [R]×[T ], define cˆr,t ∈ V ′, where bit ` of cˆr,t is cˆr,t,` = argmax{ar,`(t, 0), ar,`(t, 1)}.
3. For (r, t) ∈ [R]×[T ], define vˆr,t = Dec(cˆr,t) ∈ V .
4. Use Hashtogram(S) with privacy parameter 2 to obtain a(vˆr,t) for all (r, t) ∈ [R]×[T ].
5. Return list L = {(vˆr,t, a(vˆr,t)) : (r, t) ∈ [R]×[T ]}.
Remark 6.4. The assumption in Lemma 6.7 that log d ≥ O(log(n/β)) is without loss of generality, as otherwise the
universe size d is small enough to allow the server to run in time linear in d, which makes the problem much easier.
Specifically, if d <
√
n then we can instantiate the frequency oracle of Lemma 6.1, and query it for every domain
element. As d <
√
n, this can be executed in time ≈ n (the runtime analysis is similar to the one in Section 6.2.1).
Otherwise, if d ≥ √n then we already have that log d ≥ O(log n), and (if necessary) we can pad the representation of
domain elements to satisfy the assumption that log d ≥ O(log(n/β)).
Proof of Lemma 6.7. Item 1 of the lemma follows directly from Lemma 6.5. We now prove item 2. Consider the
following good event (over sampling h1, · · · , hR):
Event E1 (over sampling h1, · · ·, hR):
There exists a subsetR1 ⊆ [R] of size |R1| ≥ 78R s.t. for every r∗ ∈ R1 and for every v∗ ∈ S satisfying fS(v∗) ≥ n
1.5
T
it holds that |{v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(Enc(v)) = hr∗(Enc(v∗))}| ≤ 16n1.5T .
We start by showing that event E1 happens with high probability. To that end, fix v∗ ∈ S and fix r∗ ∈ [R]. We
have that
Ehr∗ [| {v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(Enc(v)) = hr∗(Enc(v∗))} |] =
∑
v∈S:v 6=v∗
Ehr∗
[
1hr∗ (Enc(v))=hr∗ (Enc(v∗))
] ≤ n
T
.
Thus, by Markov’s inequality, we have that
Pr
hr∗
[
| {v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(Enc(v)) = hr∗(Enc(v∗))} | ≥ 16n
1.5
T
]
≤ 1
16
√
n
.
Assuming that T ≤ n, there could be at most √n “heavy” elements v∗ satisfying fS(v∗) ≥ n1.5T . Hence, using the
union bound,
Pr
hr∗
[
∃v∗ s.t. fS(v∗) ≥ n
1.5
T
and | {v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(Enc(v)) = hr∗(Enc(v∗))} | ≥ 16n
1.5
T
]
≤ 1
16
.
As the hash functions are independent from each other, for R ≥ 48 ln( 1β ), by the Chernoff bound we get that with
probability at least 1− β (over sampling h1, · · · , hR) there exists a subset R1 ⊆ [R] of size |R1| ≥ 78R s.t. for every
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v∗ satisfying fS(v∗) ≥ n1.5T and every r∗ ∈ R1 it holds that
|{v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(Enc(v)) = hr∗(Enc(v∗))}| ≤ 16n
1.5
T
.
That is, event E1 happens with probability at least 1− β. We continue the analysis assuming that event E1 occurs.
Event E2 (over partitioning [n] into {Ir,`}):
There exists a subset R2 ⊆ [R] of size |R2| ≥ 78R s.t. for every r∗ ∈ R2, there exist at least 3132 log d′ choices for
`∗ ∈ [log d′] for which |Ir∗,`∗ | ≤ 2nR log d′ .
Following Theorem 2.4 (the Poisson approximation), we analyze event E2 in the Poisson case. To that end, let
I˜1,1, · · · , I˜R,log d′ be independent Poisson random variables with mean nR log d′ . Now fix (r, `) ∈ [R]×[log d′]. Using
a tail bound for the Poisson distribution (see Theorem 2.5), assuming that n ≥ 10R log d′ we have that Pr[I˜r,` ≤
2n
R log d′ ] ≥ 99100 . As I˜1,1, · · · , I˜R,log d′ are independent, assuming that R log d′ ≥ 300 ln( 3nβ ), by the Chernoff bound
we get that with probability at least 1 − β3n there are at least 98100R log d′ choices for (r, `) ∈ [R]×[log d′] s.t. I˜r,` ≤
2n
R log d′ . Hence, by Theorem 2.4, with probability at least 1 − β there are at least 98100R log d′ choices for (r, `) ∈
[R]×[log d′] s.t. |Ir,`| ≤ 2nR log d′ . If that is the case, then there must be at least 7R8 choices for r ∈ [R] for which∣∣∣∣{` ∈ [log d′] : |Ir,`| ≤ 2nR log d′
}∣∣∣∣ ≥ 3132 log d′.
That is, Pr [E2] ≥ 1− β.
Event E3 (over partitioning [n] into {Ir,`}):
For every v∗ ∈ S s.t. fS(v∗) ≥ n1.5T there exists a subset Rv
∗
3 ⊆ [R] of size |Rv
∗
3 | ≥ 78R s.t. for every r∗ ∈ Rv
∗
3 there
exist at least 3132 log d
′ choices for `∗ ∈ [log d′] for which |{j ∈ Ir∗,`∗ : vj = v∗}| ≥ fS(v
∗)
2R log d′ .
We analyze event E3 in the Poisson case. To that end, fix v∗ ∈ S s.t. fS(v∗) ≥ n1.5T , and let I˜v
∗
1,1, · · · , I˜v
∗
R,log d′
be independent Poisson random variables with mean fS(v
∗)
R log d′ . Now fix (r, `) ∈ [R]×[log d′]. Using a tail bound for
the Poisson distribution (see Theorem 2.5), assuming that n
1.5
T ≥ 37R log d′ we have that Pr[I˜r,` ≥ fS(v
∗)
2R log d′ ] ≥ 99100 .
As I˜v
∗
1,1, · · · , I˜v
∗
R,log d′ are independent, assuming that R log d
′ ≥ 300 ln( 3n2β ), by the Chernoff bound we get that with
probability at least 1− β3n2 there are at least 98100R log d′ choices for (r, `) ∈ [R]×[log d′] s.t. I˜r,` ≥ fS(v
∗)
2R log d′ . Hence,
by Theorem 2.4, with probability at least 1 − βn there are at least 98100R log d′ choices for (r, `) ∈ [R]×[log d′] s.t.
|{j ∈ Ir∗,`∗ : vj = v∗}| ≥ fS(v
∗)
2R log d′ . If that is the case, then there must be at least
7R
8 choices for r ∈ [R] for which∣∣∣∣{` ∈ [log d′] : |{j ∈ Ir∗,`∗ : vj = v∗}| ≥ fS(v∗)2R log d′
}∣∣∣∣ ≥ 3132 log d′.
Using the union bound, this holds simultaneously for every such v∗ with probability at least 1− β. That is, Pr [E3] ≥
1− β.
Event E4 (over partitioning [n] into {Ir,`}):
For every v∗ ∈ S s.t. fS(v∗) ≥ n1.5T there exists a subset Rv
∗
4 of size |Rv
∗
4 | ≥ 78 · 78R s.t. for every r∗ ∈ Rv
∗
4 there
exist at least 3132 log d
′ choices for `∗ ∈ [log d′] for which
|{j ∈ Ir∗,`∗ : vj 6= v∗ and hr∗(Enc(vj)) = hr∗(Enc(v∗))}| ≤ 32n1.5RT log d′ .
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We analyze event E4 in the Poisson case. To that end, fix v∗ ∈ S s.t. fS(v∗) ≥ n1.5T . For r ∈ [R] denote
Colr(v
∗) = |{v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr(Enc(v)) = hr(Enc(v∗))}| ,
and recall that by event E1, for r ∈ R1 we have that Colr(v∗) ≤ 16n1.5T .
Let I˜v
∗
1,1, · · · , I˜v
∗
R,log d′ be independent Poisson random variables with mean
Colr(v
∗)
R log d′ . Now fix (r, `) ∈ R1×[log d′].
Using a tail bound for the Poisson distribution (see Theorem 2.5), assuming that T ≤ n1.5R log d′ we have that Pr[I˜v
∗
r,` ≤
32n1.5
RT log d′ ] ≥ 99100 . As I˜v
∗
1,1, · · · , I˜v
∗
R,log d′ are independent, assuming that |R1| log d′ ≥ 300 ln( 3n
2
β ), by the Chernoff
bound we get that with probability at least 1− β3n2 there are at least 98100 |R1| log d′ choices for (r, `) ∈ R1×[log d′] s.t.
I˜v
∗
r,` ≤ 32n
1.5
RT log d′ . Hence, by Theorem 2.4, with probability at least 1 − βn there are at least 98100 |R1| log d′ choices for
(r, `) ∈ R1×[log d′] s.t.
|{j ∈ Ir∗,`∗ : vj 6= v∗ and hr∗(Enc(vj)) = hr∗(Enc(v∗))}| ≤ 32n
1.5
RT log d′
.
If that is the case, then there must be at least 7R18 choices for r ∈ R1 for which∣∣∣∣{` ∈ [log d′] : |{j ∈ Ir∗,`∗ : vj = v∗}| ≤ 32n1.5RT log d′
}∣∣∣∣ ≥ 3132 log d′.
Using the union bound, this holds simultaneously for every such v∗ with probability at least 1− β. That is, Pr [E4] ≥
1− β.
We are now ready to complete the proof. Fix v∗ ∈ S s.t. fS(v∗) ≥ 264n1.5T . Let R1, R2, Rv
∗
3 , R
v∗
4 be the sets
from events E1, E2, E3, E4, and observe that |R1 ∩ R2 ∩ Rv∗3 ∩ Rv
∗
4 | ≥ 38R, and furthermore, for every r∗ ∈
(R1 ∩R2 ∩Rv∗3 ∩Rv
∗
4 ) there exist at least
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32 log d
′ choices for ` ∈ [log d′] for which
(a) |{j ∈ Ir∗,` : vj = v∗}| ≥ 132n1.5TR log d′ ,
(b) |{j ∈ Ir∗,` : vj 6= v∗ and hr∗(Enc(vj)) = hr∗(Enc(v∗))}| ≤ 32n1.5TR log d′ ,
(c) |Ir∗,`| ≤ 2nR log d′ .
Denote c∗ = Enc(v∗). Observe that by items (a),(b) above, we have that
fSr∗,`(hr∗(c
∗), c∗` ) ≥ fSr∗,`(hr∗(c∗), 1− c∗` ) +
100n1.5
TR log d′
.
Let us assume that T ≤ n
326
√
R log d′ . By the properties of algorithm Hashtogram (Lemma 6.4), For every r
∗, `∗ sat-
isfying items (a),(b),(c), algorithm Hashtogram(Sr∗,`∗) ensures that with probability at least 255256 we have cˆr∗,t∗,` =
c∗` , where t
∗ = hr∗(v∗).
Now fix r∗ ∈ (R1 ∩ R2 ∩ Rv∗3 ∩ Rv
∗
4 ), and recall that the coins of Hashtogram(Sr∗,`) are independent for
different values of `. Hence, by the Chernoff bound, for log d′ ≥ 850 log(nβ ) we get that
Pr
[
|{` ∈ [log d′] : cˆr∗,t∗,` = c∗`}| ≥
9
10
log d′
]
≥ 1− β
n
.
That is, for our fixed v∗ there exists an r∗ ∈ (R1 ∩R2 ∩Rv∗3 ∩Rv
∗
4 ) s.t. with probability at least 1− βn we have that
cˆr∗,t∗ and c∗ = Enc(v∗) differ on at most 110 -fraction of their bits. Using the union bound, with probability at least
1 − β, this holds simultaneously for every v∗ s.t. fS(v∗) ≥ 264nT . By the properties of the error correction code, in
such a case, for every v∗ s.t. fS(v∗) ≥ 264n1.5T we have that vˆr∗,t∗ = Dec(cˆr∗,t∗) = v∗, and that v∗ is in the list L.
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Runtime. On step 1 algorithm Bitstogram instantiates O(R · log d) copies of the frequency oracle Hashtogram.
Every such instantiation takes time≈ n. Afterwards, the algorithm queries the oracles for a total ofO(2RT log d) ≈ n
queries, each of which takes time O˜(1). Thus, step 1 takes time ≈ n to compute. Steps 2 and 3 loop for every
(r, t) ∈ [R]×[T ], and take time ≈ RT ≈ n to compute. Finaly, step 4 instantiates Hashtogram (in time ≈ n) and
queries it for a total or R · T ≈ n queries. Overall, algorithm Bitstogram runs in time ≈ n.
Processing Memory. Recall that step 1 of algorithm Bitstogram requires querying algorithm Hashtogram
for a total of O(2RT log d) ≈ n queries. As we are aiming for an algorithm with processing memory ≈ √n, we
cannot store all of the answers in memory simultaneously. To resolve this issue, let us reorganize step 1 of algorithm
Bitstogram as follows:
1a. For every (r, `) ∈ [R]×[log d′], invoke Hashtogram(Sr,`) with 2 .
1b. For every (r, t) ∈ [R]×[T ], for every ` ∈ [log d′], query Hashtogram(Sr,`) to get
{
ar,`(t, b) : b{0, 1}
}
.
Now, every one of the steps 1b,2,3,4 of the algorithm Bitstogram contains a loop over every choice of (r, t) ∈
[R]×[T ], and we can group all of this steps together into one loop over (r, t) ∈ [R]×[T ]. If an iteration of this loop
results in a value a(vˆr,t) ≤
√
n, we can simply ignore it (recall that the frequencies of domain elements that are not
in the list L are estimated as zero, and that
√
n is less than the guaranteed bound on the error of the protocol, so this
step does not effect our error bounds). As there could be at most
√
n elements with frequencies at least ≈ √n, the
necessary processing memory is only ≈ √n.
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A Missing Proofs for Section 5
A.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
It is easy to see that each invocation of LocalRnd is /2-locally differentially private since conditioned on any realiza-
tion of `i, ji, ri, for any pair of possible input items vi, v′i ∈ V to LocalRnd and any output bit b generated in step 7 of
Algorithm 1, we have
P [yi = b | vi] ≤ e/2 P [yi = b | v′i]
Note that LocalRnd is invoked only twice for each user: once when Final = 0 (the scanning/pruning phase of
TreeHist) and another time when Final = 1 (the final phase of TreeHist). Thus, it follows that protocol TreeHist is
-differentially private.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2
Let β ∈ (0, 1) and η as defined in the theorem statement. Consider the pruning phase of TreeHist, that is, Steps 1 to
11 in Algorithm 3. Let γ be as set in Step 2. In this phase, TreeHist invokes FreqOracle once in every iteration of the
outer for loop (over the levels of the tree) with the flag Final = 0. Consider any such iteration `. Suppose, for now,
that the size of ChildSet(Prefixes) passed to FreqOracle in that iteration is at most 2n/η. (We will show that with
probability at least 1 − β this condition is satisfied at all levels ` of the tree, i.e., it’s a loop invariant). By invoking
Lemma 5.3 with V̂ = ChildSet(Prefixes), {I˜j : j ∈ [t]} = {I`,j : j ∈ [t]}, and γ = t log d = 110 log(n/β) log d,
we have that with probability at least 1− β/ log(d), for every vˆ ∈ ChildSet(Prefixes) : f(vˆ) > 3η, FreqOracle gives
an estimate fˆ(vˆ) ≥ 2η, and for every vˆ ∈ ChildSet(Prefixes) : f(vˆ) ≤ η, FreqOracle gives an estimate fˆ(vˆ) < 2η.
Hence, Step 9 implies, that with probability at least 1 − β/ log d, all vˆ ∈ ChildSet(Prefixes) with true frequencies
f(vˆ) ≥ 3η will proceed to the next iteration `+ 1 and all those vˆ ∈ ChildSet(Prefixes) with true frequencies f(vˆ) < η
will be pruned out. Since the number of nodes vˆ with true frequency f(vˆ) ≥ η cannot be more than n/η, then the
number of surviving nodes in the next iteration `+ 1 cannot be more than 2n/η. Hence, this condition will be satisfied
in the next iteration, and we can proceed in the same fashion. Note that when ` = 1, the condition is trivially satisfied
since there are only 2 < 2n/η nodes at that level. This induction argument shows that with probability at least 1− β,
for every level ` ∈ [log d], the surviving nodes at level ` correspond to prefixes whose true frequencies are not below
η and include all prefixes whose true frequencies are above 3η. In particular, with probability at least 1− β, all items
in SuccHist satisfy these properties. This covers the proof of items 1 and 2 of Theorem 5.2.
Now, consider the final phase of TreeHist, that is, Steps 12 to 14 Algorithm 3. Let γ be as set in Step 12. In this
phase, TreeHist invokes FreqOracle on the surviving nodes at the final level of the tree (the last update of Prefixes)
and with input flag Final = 1. Now, by invoking Lemma 5.3 with V̂ = Prefixes, {I˜j : j ∈ [t]} = {Ij : j ∈ [t]}, and
γ = t = 110 log(n/β), we have that with probability at least 1− β/ log(d), for every vˆ ∈ Prefixes, |fˆ(vˆ)− f(vˆ)| ≤
14
√
nt/ = O
(√
n log(n/β)

)
. This proves item 3 of the theorem.
B Missing proofs from Section 6
B.1 Proof of Lemma 6.4
Consider the following good event:
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Event E1 (over sampling h1, · · ·, hR):
For every query v∗ ∈ V there exists a subset Rv∗1 ⊆ [R] of size |Rv
∗
1 | ≥ 78R s.t. for every r∗ ∈ Rv
∗
1 it holds that
|{v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(v) = hr∗(v∗)}| ≤ 16nT .
Event E1 states that for at least 7R/8 of the hash functions, we have that v∗ is mapped into a cell without too
many collisions with different input elements. Informally, for every single hash function hr, algorithm HashHist
estimates the number of occurrences of hr(v∗) in S. Hence, if event E1 occurs, then most of the estimations result in
accurate answers. We start by showing that event E1 happens with high probability. To that end, fix v∗ ∈ V and fix
r∗ ∈ [R]. We have that
Ehr∗ [| {x ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(v) = hr∗(v∗)} |] =
∑
v∈S:v 6=v∗
Ehr∗
[
1hr∗ (v)=hr∗ (v∗)
] ≤ n
T
.
Thus, by Markov’s inequality, we have that
Pr
hr∗
[
| {v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(v) = hr∗(v∗)} | ≥ 16n
T
]
≤ 1
16
.
As the hash functions are independent from each other, for R ≥ 48 ln(d′β ), by the Chernoff bound we get that with
probability at least 1 − β/d′ (over sampling h1, . . . , hR) there exists a subset Rv∗1 ⊆ [R] of size |Rv
∗
1 | ≥ 78R s.t. for
every r∗ ∈ Rv∗1 it holds that
|{v ∈ S : v 6= v∗ and hr∗(v) = hr∗(v∗)}| ≤ 16n
T
.
Using the union bound, we have that event E1 happens with probability at least 1 − β. We continue the analysis
assuming that event E1 occurs.
Assuming that n ≥ 8R log(2R/β), by the Chernoff bound, with probability at least 1 − β (over partitioning [n]
into subsets I1, . . . , IR), for every r ∈ [R] we have that n2R ≤ |Ir| ≤ 2nR . We continue the analysis assuming that this
is the case.
For every r ∈ [R], let Sr = (vj)j∈Ir denote a database containing the data of all users j s.t. j ∈ Ir. Also for
v∗ ∈ V and r ∈ [R] denote |Sr,v∗ | , |{v ∈ S : hr(v) = hr(v∗)}|. That is, |Sr,v∗ | is the number of users j s.t.
hr(vj) = hr(v
∗). Furthermore, for v∗ ∈ V and r ∈ [R] denote |Iv∗r | , |{v ∈ Sr : hr(v) = hr(v∗)}|. That is, |Iv
∗
r | is
the number of users j s.t. j ∈ Ir and hr(vj) = hr(v∗). Observe that |Sr,v∗ | ≥ fS(v∗) and that |Iv∗r | ≥ fSr (v∗).
Fix v∗ ∈ V . By the Chernoff bound, with probability at least 1 − β/d′ (over partitioning [n] into subsets
I1, . . . , IR), for every r ∈ [R] we have that∣∣∣ R · |Iv∗r | − |Sr,v∗ | ∣∣∣ ≤
√
3R · |Sr,v∗ | · log(2Rd
′
β
). (4)
Using the union bound this holds simultaneously for every v∗ ∈ V and r ∈ [R] with probability at least 1 − β. We
continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case.
Event E2 (over sampling Z and the coins of the local randomizers):
For every query v∗ ∈ V there exists a subset Rv∗2 ⊆ [R] of size |Rv
∗
2 | ≥ 78R s.t. for every r∗ ∈ Rv
∗
2 it holds that∣∣ R · ar∗(hr∗(v∗))−R · |Iv∗r∗ | ∣∣ ≤ e+1e−1 · √11nR.
For v∗ ∈ V and r ∈ [R] denote cr(v∗) =
∑
j∈Ir yj · Z[hr(v∗), j], and recall that algorithm Hashtogram
answers the query v∗ with a(v∗) = R · e+1e−1 ·Medianr∈[R]{cr(v∗)}. Fix v∗ ∈ V and r ∈ [R]. We now analyze the
expectation of cr(v∗):
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E[c(v∗)] =
∑
j∈Ir
E [yj · Z[hr(v∗), j]]
=
∑
j∈Ir: hr(vj)=hr(v∗)
E [yj · Z[hr(v∗), j]] +
∑
j∈Ir: hr(vj) 6=hr(v∗)
E [yj · Z[hr(v∗), j]]
=
∑
j∈Ir: hr(vj)=hr(v∗)
E [yj · Z[hr(v∗), j]] +
∑
j∈Ir: hr(vj) 6=hr(v∗)
E [yj ] · E [Z[hr(v∗), j]]
= |{v ∈ Sr : hr(v) = hr(v∗)}| · e
 − 1
e + 1
, |Iv∗r | ·
e − 1
e + 1
That is, cr(v) can be expressed as two sums of ±1 independent random variables: |Iv∗r | variables with expectation
e−1
e+1 , and (|Ir| − |Iv
∗
r |) variables with expectation 0 (recall that n2R ≤ |Ir| ≤ 2nR ). Using the Hoeffding bound, with
probability at least 43/44 we have that
∣∣∣ cr(v∗)− e−1e+1 · |Iv∗r | ∣∣∣ ≤√11n/R. That is,∣∣∣ R · ar(hr(v∗))−R · |Iv∗r | ∣∣∣ ≤ e + 1e − 1 · √11nR. (5)
Fix v∗ ∈ V , and observe that the above sums are independent for different values of r. Hence, using the Chernoff
bound and asserting that R ≥ 132 ln(d′/β), for that fixed v∗ ∈ V , with probability at least 1 − β/d′ we have that
Inequality (5) holds for at least 7R/8 choices of r ∈ [R]. Using the union bound, with probability at least 1− β, this
is true for every v∗ ∈ V simultaneously. That is, event E2 happens with probability at least 1 − β. We continue the
analysis assuming that event E2 occurs. For every v∗ ∈ V we denote Rv∗3 = Rv
∗
1 ∩Rv
∗
2 .
Combining event E2 with Inequality (4), we get that for every r ∈ Rv∗2∣∣∣ R · ar(hr(v∗))− |Sr,v∗ | ∣∣∣ ≤ e + 1
e − 1 ·
√
11nR+
√
3R · |Sr,v∗ | · log(2Rd
′
β
). (6)
Recall that for every v∗ ∈ V and every r ∈ [R] we have that |Sr,v∗ | ≥ fS(v∗). Furthermore, for every v∗ ∈ V
and every r ∈ Rv∗1 we have that |Sr,v
∗ | ≤ fS(v∗) + 16nT . Hence, for every v∗ ∈ V and every r ∈ Rv
∗
3 we have that
| R · ar(hr(v∗))− fS(v∗) | ≤ e
 + 1
e − 1 ·
√
11nR+
√
3R ·
(
fS(v∗) +
16n
T
)
· log(2Rd
′
β
) +
16n
T
, error(v∗).
That is, for every r ∈ Rv∗3 we have that R · ar(hr(v∗)) is accurate up to error(v∗). As |Rv
∗
3 | ≥ 34R, and as algorithm
Hashtogram answers v∗ with a(v∗) chosen as the median of {R · ar(hr(v∗))}, we get that |a(v∗) − fS(v∗)| ≤
error(v∗) for every v∗ ∈ V .
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